As Martin Enserink reports at Science Insider:

Two groups of scientists who carried out highly controversial studies with the avian influenza virus H5N1 have reluctantly agreed to strike certain details from manuscripts describing their work after having been asked to do so by a U.S. biosecurity council. The as-yet unpublished papers, which are under review at Nature and Science, will be changed to minimize the risks that they could be misused by would-be bioterrorists.

The “biosecurity council” in question is the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, an arm of the NIH’s Office of Science Policy.   It has recommended censorship of research on genetic alterations of avian (H5N1) flu that might make the virus easily transmissible between humans and pathogenic as well — ingredients for a potentially serious human outbreak.

I attach little public health importance to the experimental work, carried out by Fouchier in the Netherlands and Kawaoka in the U.S.  Flu’s behavior in human populations has been notoriously difficult to predict, even with relatively advanced molecular information about viral strains.  Flu forecasters repeatedly predict bad outbreaks and even (as in 2009) devastating pandemics — which fail to materialize.

Even when it comes to the most studied flu outbreak of all, the 1918 pandemic, opinions still differ on why so many millions of people died.

This week, what concerns me is the biosecurity industry.  It seems more than ever eager to terrify people.   The Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments themselves are interesting but hardly recipes for disaster.   And yet, some voices say the research shouldn’t have been carried out in the first place.  Surprisingly, they include the respected D.A. Henderson, here much mistaken.  He editorializes this week with two coauthors for the online publication Biosecurity and Bioterrorism.

It’s not opposition to science — it’s just the biosecurity “experts” making a living.

The move to suppress publication of research results because scientific findings might tip off some chimerical evildoers is ridiculous.  Fouchier, Kawaoka, and their teams were obviously trying to contribute to the search for ways to make people safer.   That’s what most people want science to do.  Instead of urging caution, the many scientists on the NSABB should be standing up for the wide dissemination of scientific findings — not for suppressing them.  Made-up concerns over “bioterrorism” should not trump public access to scientific research.

And the NSABB scientists shouldn’t be cowed by the self-professed biosecurity “experts” at the Center for Biosecurity.

The sole raison-d’etre of the “biosecurity” business is to keep itself in business — by keeping people terrified.   It does that by continually invoking impossible scenarios that are supposed to (a) frighten the public and (b) cause the public to buy products that we don’t need or give up rights that we do need.

After being scared into thinking the 2009 H1N1 outbreak was going to be a reprise of the 1918 flu calamity and finding that it was exceptionally mild instead, surely the public is not going to be taken in by the biosecurity industry much longer.

It’s anybody’s guess as to whether the new findings about H5N1 are at all meaningful in (human) public health terms.  Which is what happens with science.  That’s why the point of suppressing the findings isn’t to make anyone safer – - it’s just to keep the biosecurity experts in business.

The subject is a report published by CDC today claiming that obesity among NYC schoolkids in grades K through 8 has decreased 5.5%.

The city’s health commissioner, Thomas A. Farley has been true to the shades of history’s empty-headed warriors.  Farley announced that the drop in obesity prevalence is a “turning-point in the obesity epidemic” although it “does not by any means mark the end.”

A missed photo opp:  Dr. Farley standing on top of a fat child, holding up a sign reading, “Mission Accomplished.”

Farley is zealous about controlling people’s behavior and contemptuous of facts (nobody will ever accuse him of being an intellectual, either).  He blogs about his own work for the exclusive reading pleasure of Department of Health staffers.  This allows his staff to read the Farley-esque twist on truth.  One example for now:  in October of 2010, Farley’s blog exultantly told his staff that in 2009 the department had “immunized nearly 130,000 children [against flu] in more than 1,200 schools over a few months.”  Of course, health department employees are smart — many of them knew that the 2009 H1N1 vaccine Farley was talking about was a fiasco, far too late to make a difference, and aimed at an outbreak that was more of a whimper than a bang.

What about today’s “turning point” in the obesity war?  It’s worth noting that the supposed drop in obesity among NYC schoolkids is really just a very slight (1.2%) difference in the prevalence of obesity between 2006-7 and 2010-11.

A small difference between small numbers amounts to a large percentage difference.  So the 1.2%  actual difference magically turns into the advertised 5.5% — the proportionate change.

But the false advertising gets worse

1.  The prevalence of obesity in NYC was not measured multiple times on the same group of kids (to use epidemiology jargon:  this wasn’t a panel study).  Nobody observed fat children becoming less fat.  The city simply measured obesity prevalence each year on 5- to 14-year-olds who were in the school system.  So a high proportion of the 21.9% of kids who were labeled obese in 2006-7 would have been out of the age range for the 2010-11 assessment.

Plus, lots of kids leave the NYC school system after grade school (this has to do with Bloomberg administration’s bizarre system for preventing children from attending local schools).  So, even those children who haven’t aged out of the analysis by turning 15 would be absent from the data after a few years.  And, there’s also natural immigration and emigration.

Did the 2006 fat kids get slimmer?  Nobody knows.  The 2006-7 obesity prevalence among NYC schoolkids (21.9%) can’t be compared to the 2010-11 prevalence (20.7%).  If you were forced to compare these numbers, you’d say there had been a slight change — not a 5.5% decline.  There’s the first lie.

2.  The second lie is a little more complicated.   Since there is no widely accepted functional definition for childhood obesity, children are labeled obese if their body-mass index (BMI) falls into the upper 5% of the expected distribution of weight-for-height.  This expectation is based on an old-fashioned standard.  Fair enough.  But lots of distributions shift over time — SAT scores, human height, grades awarded at Ivy League colleges, and global average temperature, to name a few.

Sometimes the reason for an overall shift of this sort isn’t hard to specify (test prep, nutritional quality, relaxation of grading standards, generalized global warming, etc.).  But the main effect causing a shift in the distribution doesn’t explain why the few people who are in the upper reaches of the distribution are so far from the mean.  To say that fewer children are now above the high-BMI cutoff than in 2006-7 therefore the tendency of children to be fat is declining is a lot like claiming that because 2011 was cooler than 2009 and 2010, global temperatures are not really going up.

(Dr. Farley, I gather that statistics aren’t your strong suit, but surely when you witnessed that snowstorm we had this past October — an outlier if there ever was one — you didn’t conclude that the climate is actually getting colder, not hotter.  So what makes you think that a very tiny decrease in the proportion of kids with high BMIs means that the city’s kids are getting slimmer?)

3.  Claiming credit.   Attributing to the health agency’s own efforts a minuscule change in the proportion of kids who are in the upper tail of the broad BMI distribution requires self-congratulation so acrobatic as to stretch credulity.

Maybe there really has been some change in the city’s children since 2006.  Or in our food supply or buying habits.  Or exercising.  But to claim that such a change both caused the tiny decline in schoolkid obesity prevalence and that it was the result of the Health Department’s efforts — the exercising and the low-fat milk and the salad bars in the school cafeterias and so forth — is to commit the fallacy that Rene Dubos outlined (in his book Mirage of Health) nearly 50 years ago:

When the tide is receding from the beach it is easy to have the illusion that one can empty the ocean by removing water with a pail.

Is childhood obesity really a health problem?

It’s not crazy for health professionals to be concerned about body mass.  Obesity might be really bad for some people, and somewhat bad for many.

But those people are adults.  Why are health agencies like NYC’s so riled up about obesity in little children?

So far, there’s no strong evidence that obesity in younger children predicts any real harm later in life, other than being a fat adult.  With adults, several signs of impending debility are more commonly found in the obese than the non-obese, such as hardening of the arteries, fatty liver, sleep apnea, and diabetes.   And with adolescents, there’s some evidence that those who are obese develop similar warning signs.  But not younger kids.

A 2005 BMJ paper reported only social effects in adulthood (being unemployed and being without a romantic partner) of early obesity.  Similarly, one cohort study carried out in Newcastle upon Tyne found little evidence that fat children became fat adults, and no evidence for predictors of illness in adulthood among those who had been overweight as children — although other studies have shown correlations between adolescent obesity and adult problems.

For kids below age 15, the most visible problem with obesity is that it occurs most commonly among the poor and dark-skinned.  This bothers the obesity warriors.  In fact, not only is obesity more common in African- and Hispanic-American children in NYC, even the slipshod standards of today’s report on NYC schoolkids can’t be manipulated to show that obesity is declining among these children.

As with all holy wars, from the Children’s Crusade through the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the warriors aren’t really concerned about principle.  Something about somebody got under their skin.

Here’s how I answer my own question:  I guess the obesity crusaders don’t like it when the children of the wealthy look like the children of the poor.  They think that white kids on the Upper East Side aren’t supposed to look like kids who live in the Bronx.

It isn’t about health, in other words.  It isn’t even about obesity.  The “childhood obesity epidemic” is about making sure society looks the way that the health crusaders want it to look.

[t]he most popular contraceptive for women in eastern and southern Africa, a hormone shot given every three months, appears to double the risk the women will become infected with H.I.V.

and almost everybody else (as diversely situated in newsworld as the Atlantic, CNN health blog, Catholic News Agency, and Voice of America) joined the NYT in failing to examine it critically.

Gerdts and Vohra add the essential context that was missed by the newsmedia:  about a half-million women die during or because of childbirth each year, almost all of them in poor countries.

At RH Reality Check, Jodi Jacobson summarizes the main cautions about the Heffron study, and points to a Guttmacher Institute white paper.  She takes into account concerns about high maternal and infant mortality in parts of Africa, the harms associated with complications of pregnancy and unsafe abortions, and, of course, the substantial possibility of vertical transmission of HIV in places where antiretroviral therapy isn’t universally available.

To claim that poor women should give more weight to the rather remote risk of acquiring a virus that might cause serious illness years down the road than to the dangers of pregnancy itself in the near term is to reduce real women to automata.  Facing dire straits they might be, but they’re supposed to be reasoning machines, programmed to engage in the AIDS industry’s preferred calculus, risk.

A quick summary of the shortcomings of the Heffron et al. research:  comparing users of hormonal contraception to nonusers, the difference in actual risk of acquiring or transmitting HIV was very small, amounting to 1 to 3 new infections per one hundred contraceptive users over and above the infection rate for nonusers.  And it’s impossible to say that these excess infections were actually attributable to the contraceptive — because the study wasn’t a clinical trial.  A great many aspects of social setting, relationships, health, and welfare of the study subjects would have been different between contraception users and nonusers, some of which would undoubtedly account for differences in rate of HIV transmission.

And since all of the subjects were in so-called discordant couples — one partner infected with HIV, the other not — it would be unusual to expect no HIV transmission at all.

Unless, of course, the subjects had been offered antiretroviral therapy, ART.  But this the researchers did not do.  They referred eligible subjects to HIV clinics.  They seem not to have checked whether people who needed ART were getting it.  They seem not to have offered ART to women who got pregnant, either.  Certainly, their Lancet article makes no report of doing so.

I wondered if this was too much to expect of researchers — so I asked the students taking my course on global AIDS and human rights.  Undergraduates, I find, generally have a clearer sense of ethics than most medical researchers.

Even the students who felt that the Heffron study was worth doing and basically sound were troubled by the researchers’ lack of curiosity as to whether HIV-infected subjects were getting the ART drugs they needed.  And most of the students thought this was a disabling ethical fault, which should have caused human subjects committees to make the researchers redesign the study.  One student pointed out that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, one of the study’s funding sources, could easily afford to pay for antiretroviral therapy for all of the roughly 2,000 HIV-infected people in the study.

In the end, my students had the questions that Marcia Angell raised in her editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2011 (PDF at this link angell editorial nejm 2000 ):  Don’t physician researchers have the same responsibility to study subjects that they do to their own patients?  And therefore, when their subjects lack resources to obtain effective therapy for treatable conditions, don’t the researchers have a moral obligation to make the therapies available?

Heffron et al. didn’t do this.  They watched HIV-infected people transmit HIV to their partners (the researchers provided HIV testing and counseling about avoiding transmission — but they don’t make clear whether they notified uninfected partners that they might be in harm’s way).  They did little to prevent transmission.  Notably, they didn’t offer ART to people with low CD4 counts.  Nor did they offer post-exposure prophylaxis to uninfected people who had had intercourse with an infected partner.  They just watched.

On this account, the Heffron study wasn’t only flawed — it was so questionable on ethical grounds that the Lancet should be ashamed to have published it.  And the funders — the NIH as well as the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation — censured.

The occasion was CDC’s publication in PLOS One of new figures claiming that the annual number of new HIV infections in the U.S. is only around 50,000.

And if you read the CDC’s new Fact Sheet on HIV infection, just posted, you find out that

The current level of HIV incidence in the United States is likely not sustainable. Prevention efforts in recent years have successfully averted significant increases in new HIV infections, despite the growing number of people living with HIV and AIDS who are able to transmit the virus.

CDC English is a little difficult for native speakers to interpret, but I think that the translation of “likely not sustainable” is:  “we need more money or else the incidence is going to go up.”

Now, 50,000 new HIV infections each year is bad news for 50,000 Americans.  But on a population basis, it’s not a very high number.  The HIV prevention industry will wring its hands, and perhaps Mr. Kramer will, too.  They can all grumble that after 30 years of AIDS there should be no new infections at all.   But that’s ridiculous.  A pipe dream.  HIV is a sexually transmissible infection.  And STIs can’t be eradicated — because, well, people have sex.  No matter what.  And sometimes the kind of sex that isn’t recommended by the experts. With the wrong people.  And so forth.

Really, that there are only 50,000 new infections each year is a sign of (a) the low inherent infectiousness of HIV and (b) Americans’ sharp awareness of how to protect themselves from HIV infection.   It’s not really clear that any new prevention is needed.

What is needed:  get effective treatment into more HIV-infected people.   Obviously, to slow the progression of HIV-based impairment in the individual — but also as a public health measure, to reduce the HIV carrier’s infectivity and thereby reduce the probability of transmission.  It would have medical value and public health value.  But there’s not much policy on that.

CDC officials are bean counters, not policy makers.  That’s why, Mr. Kramer, your expectations are too high.  The CDC’s job is not to do anything about AIDS.  CDC’s job was never to do anything about AIDS.  CDC’s job was, and is, and presumably will always be:  to keep CDC in business.

They’re terrific bean counters, obsessive, scrupulous, punctilious, completely absorbed in their own assumption that their data are a source of truth, committed to deciphering the supposedly unequivocal message the data send.

The message, always, is “CDC needs to do more of what it’s been doing.”

I gave the CDC a hard time in August 2008, when the agency published its estimate that there are 56,000 new HIV infections in the U.S. each year.  That seemed too high, I told the NY Times at the time.  Of course, it was useful for the CDC’s rudderless AIDS division to claim that HIV incidence was higher than everyone thought:  suddenly, lots of people were urging that HIV  prevention programs be beefed up.

Now, the agency has backpedaled. The 2006 incidence wasn’t 56,000 after all, the CDC now figures, it was only 48,000.  And anyway 56,000 is the same as 48,000, the agency now says.

Let me summarize:  Back in 2008, the CDC’s estimate supposedly showed that prevention wasn’t working, so the agency needed to do more of it.  The new estimate, which is almost the same as the old estimate, shows that prevention does work, so the agency needs to do more of it.  All CDC calculations point to the same conclusion:  keep CDC in business.

If CDC were interested in the nation’s health, more so than maintaining its meager status quo, it would be advocating for more treatment (to Donald McNeil’s credit, he makes that point in today’s NYT article).

And if CDC were interested in HIV as a public health problem, and not just in bean counting for the purposes of keeping itself in business, it would stop putting its beans into 30-year-old jars.  What’s the point of the tired “race/ethnicity” breakdown?  Does anybody know anymore how to categorize people into the ancient non-Hispanic-black/Hispanic-including-black/non-Hispanic-white codification?  Does anybody know what it means?

And the famous transmission categories, the MSM-IDU-heterosexual-other breakdown:  that was useful early on, when we weren’t sure that the modes of communication of HIV were fully known.  But that era ended in 1985.

Dear CDC:  Could you please put your beans into some useful jars?

No, it’s asking too much.  Because CDC’s aim isn’t to be useful.  It’s to keep counting beans exactly the way it knows how to count them, and put them into the same jars as always, and keep on concluding that the data — the beans — show that CDC must keep on doing exactly what it has been doing.

In an article in the July issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, just out, Piarroux and colleagues assert that (quoting from their abstract) “Our findings strongly suggest that contamination of the Artibonite [River] and 1 of its tributaries downstream from a military camp triggered the epidemic.”

So the mystery is solved, more or less.  The news media have taken note:  articles on the EID report have already been written by the AP, Guardian, and other sources, and are being picked up fairly widely today.

The news, based on a report ordered by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,  is being treated as an about-face on the UN’s part — because the organization, along with WHO and CDC, refused last fall to do an in-depth investigation of the origin of the outbreak.  So, according to the media’s coverage, this week’s report exposes some hypocrisy on the part of the health organizations.

That’s silly, and wrong.   I’m usually critical of WHO and CDC, but in the case of the Haitian outbreak they were completely correct to refuse to “investigate.”  As I wrote last fall, cholera isn’t a detective story, it’s a disaster.  To investigate the so-called origin of an outbreak that is as self-evidently the result of  calamitous conditions, state poverty, and helpless officialdom is to shift the blame.  Dodge the truth.

The work by Piarroux and colleagues in establishing a clear description of the origin and progress of the Haitian outbreak is impressive, often elegant, quite convincing.  But to believe, as some do, that it somehow proves that the UN and WHO are responsible for a catastrophe, or that sending foreigners into Haiti is always bad, or even that (as the authors of the EID paper say)

Putting an end to the controversy over the cholera origin could ease prevention and treatment by decreasing the distrust associated with the widespread suspicions of a cover-up of a deliberate importation of cholera

is to misunderstand public health.

The problem in Haiti is, and has been, a problem of predisposition — nature out of balance, people on the move, dire straits of all kinds (food, medicine, clean water, toilets, housing, etc.)  too tolerable to weak leaders.  Colonization by one aid group after another (UN included).  It was inevitable that cholera was going to break out.

To take the Piarroux report as definitive is to mistake the germ for the disease, mistake the outbreak for the problem, mistake the detective story for the real disaster — the real disaster being self-explanatory and not in need of “investigation”:  not enough money and not enough political will to keep the public from getting sick.

Phillips’s focus in that post is on a new WHO Atlas on headaches

and the problem that headaches cause people to stay home from work, or work less productively.   The agency estimates that Europe-wide, the lost productivity from migraines alone is worth 155 billion euros each year.  It isn’t that you feel crummy when your head hurts, and that chronic headache makes your life miserable.  It’s that you might not perform your expected per-capita service to the expansion of wealth.

Here’s how EP-ology assesses the agency:

The WHO is not the humanitarian organization that many people might think it is.  It is a special-interest medical-industry-oriented organization with an emphasis on the interests of governments, not people.  Its emphasis on productivity in looking at headaches … ignores people’s welfare…

Now, I can’t agree with Phillips’s analysis that the WHO’s ethical system is either “communist” or “fascist.”  For self-described public health agencies like the WHO to be concerned primarily with productivity and the generation of wealth — and only secondarily, if at all, with suffering — has been a hallmark of capitalism since the British Parliament passed the world’s first Public Health Act in 1848.

In fact, the laws institutionalizing public health in Britain in the late 1840s were passed by the Whig (liberal, more or less) government of Lord John Russell.  Public health was a legacy of efforts not by the nascent socialist and communist movements, but by radical capitalists — who sought to secure a moderately hale labor force to serve British industry with little cost to the factory owners.  And aimed to blame individuals for their own misery.

But it’s impossible to disagree with the main point of Phillips’s post:  WHO’s aim is to serve industry.

As further evidence, consider this follow-up note on Tamiflu by Helen Epstein, published in the May 26th issue of NY Review of Books (I discussed Epstein’s main article in a post last month).  It seems more and more apparent that potential dangers of Tamiflu (oseltamivir) in children were ignored.  Epstein reports that

the risks of delirium and unconscious episodes were indeed significantly elevated in children who took Tamiflu, especially if they took the drug during the first day or so after influenza symptoms appeared….  If these results are confirmed, they are especially worrying, since the World Health Organization and the US Centers for Disease Control both recommend that Tamiflu be taken as soon as possible after symptoms appear.

I was not the only one unaware of this important study; neither, apparently, were the World Health Organization, the US Food and Drug Administration, and the US Centers for Disease Control. When I contacted these agencies in January and February 2011, their spokespeople assured me that there was no evidence that Tamiflu causes neuropsychiatric side effects in children. [emphasis added]

In the rush to move taxpayer monies into the hands of wealthy private corporations, the WHO (with CDC and other agencies) proclaimed a flu emergency in 2009.  And ignored evidence on possible dangers of the products they were touting as part of the “preparedness” response.

I’ve covered the profit-motivated thinking behind vaccine recommendations generally and specifically with regard to flu immunization.  Epstein’s main interest is in the role of pharmaceutical companies in promoting oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) and other neuraminidase inhibitors as public health responses to flu fears.  Her story features the brilliant work of Tom Jefferson and colleagues, and the shady behavior of the global biotech firm Roche in trying to block Jefferson et al.’s efforts to investigate the safety of neuraminidase-blocking agents.

Jefferson was lead author on the Cochrane Collaborations’ main paper on neuraminidase inhibitors for flu prevention and treatment.   But when reports of adverse effects of these drugs emerged and he and colleagues tried to re-assess the underlying reports on which the effectiveness of oseltamivir and similar drugs was based, Jefferson was stymied.  His colleague, Peter Doshi, related the story in BMJ.   The journal’s editor-in-chief, Fiona Godlee, along with Cochrane director Mike Clarke, wrote in an accompanying editorial:

The review and a linked investigation undertaken jointly by the BMJ and Channel 4 News cast doubt not only on the effectiveness and safety of oseltamivir (Tamiflu) but on the system by which drugs are evaluated, regulated, and promoted.

The take-home message is that while there is evidence that Tamiflu can be effective in treating flu, the evidence is shakier than it seems, and troubling reports point to potentially serious adverse effects.

How does a questionable medication get to be the basis (or part of the basis) for public health policy?  The answer is that the policy makers and the money makers work hand in hand.

Maryann Napoli at Center for Medical Consumers tried to point out the troubling links between WHO and big pharma last year, and Steven Novella at Science-Based Medicine brought it up around the same time.

But most of the coverage focuses on the involvement of individual scientists and/or physicians who are receiving payments or other forms of remuneration directly from drug companies.  It’s not hard to police such straightforward conflicts — and so it was easy for Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General, to say last year that “at no time, not for one second, did commercial interests enter my decision-making.”

Epstein’s great contribution is in showing that obvious conflicts of interest aren’t the main way that for-profit companies influence policy.  It’s done through stonewalling, as Jefferson encountered when he tried to examine Roche’s data.  It’s done through widely accepted collusions.

For instance, the CDC Foundation — “Helping CDC Do More, Faster” is its motto — is a nonprofit organization, created by the U.S. Congress, whose job is to

connect the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with private-sector organizations and individuals to build public health programs that make our world healthier and safer.

Of course, calling them “private-sector organizations” suggests that these are not-for-profits — and some, like the District of Columbia Department of Health, the Medical College of South Carolina, and UNICEF, really are.  But most of the private-sector collaborators who are linked with CDC’s policy makers by the CDC Foundation are big corporations.  They include all the giants of Pharma world:  Merck, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi-Pasteur, etc.  (They also include some who are just giants:  Google, Dell, YUM! Brands, and IBM, to name a few.)

So when CDC’s updated flu response plan now recommends antiviral (i.e., neuraminidase-inhibitor) treatment “as soon as possible,” it’s worth asking whether this is because it has any public health value (answer:  no) or just because CDC is cozy with companies that make money when people get sick.

A paper by David Leon in this month’s International Journal of Epidemiology showed the dramatic increase in life expectancy — the median age at death, that is.  It has reached over 85 years for women in Japan, but it’s high even in countries where longevity was relatively low a generation ago.  Cheeringly, US life expectancy at birth is now 78 years; in the UK it’s 80.  And it’s even higher in some countries of western continental Europe.  Here are the graphs for different parts of the world from Leon’s paper, showing trends since 1970:

Life expectancy since 1970

Lyons has gone after the anti-obesity crusaders before (as well as related topics at his smart blog on contemporary food confusion, Panic On A Plate).  Now, he’s particularly disturbed by the sermonizing about eating. “You can’t even have a pie and a pint without someone telling you it will kill you, it seems,” Lyons writes at Spiked.

And, really, it’s even worse than that — because it’s not just eating that’s the subject of the lecturing.  It might be true that you will live longer if you give up smoking, cut your salt intake, drop your BMI down to 24.99, exercise four times per week for at least 20 minutes each time, get immunized against flu and human papillomavirus, drink in moderation, and take naps.  But unfortunately there’s not a bit of evidence that any of that — apart from the decline in smoking — has contributed to increasing longevity.

And of course, even with smoking cessation, there’s no telling whether it would make any difference to you — only on average.

So why are the public health messages so far away from what really matters — basically, prenatal care, postnatal care, and wealth (with its concomitant, standard of living)?  Well, there’s a puzzle.

What’s the point of having an industry whose main aim is to make sure that people are constantly in fear that they are doing something that will kill them — even as it becomes apparent that most of what people do is only making us live longer?   Lyons calls it Good News Omission Mentality Syndrome (GNOMES).

I ask you:  could it have something to do with control?  And the desire to sell products?

But I confess I’m no fan of her work.  Kolbert’s sky-is-falling! rhetoric is a little too florid, and her criticism of people who don’t act environmentally a little too pointed.

Yet, her short piece in this week’s New Yorker, “The Nuclear Risk,” is terrific.  It’s worth reading.   She gets at a central lesson of the radioactivity crisis that followed on the earthquake + tsunami disaster:  you can only plan for the disasters you’re able to conceive of.  The Japanese catastrophe, she writes

illustrates, so starkly and so tragically, [that] people have a hard time planning for events that they don’t want to imagine happening. But these are precisely the events that must be taken into account in a realistic assessment of risk. We’ve more or less pretended that our nuclear plants are safe, and so far we have got away with it. The Japanese have not.

That the nuclear crisis is supposedly under control now, or might be under control if some new problems are dealt with, doesn’t change the planning problem (and have a look at this blog post by Evan Osnos for a worrying take on what happens to people who are facing such a triplex disaster scenario).

Kolbert relates the problem of nuclear planning in the U.S. to corporate interference with regulatory agencies, quoting the Government Accountability Office’s finding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has based its policies

on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than on an assessment of the terrorist threat itself.

It’s disturbing that industry and regulators are on intimate terms, but it isn’t exactly news — not in regard to energy policy, nor health policy (for example, consider the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, which I wrote about a year ago).   The comfortable collusion between corporations and government agencies is an issue — but it’s not the most troubling lesson of the Japanese crisis.

Rather, the main event is the inevitability of unforeseen and unforeseeable disasters.  And the simple impossibility of making plans to avoid what can’t be imagined.

Which is where I part company with Kolbert.   Would better planning (or stricter regulation of industry) have avoided the near-catastrophic radioactive release at Daichii?  Yes, perhaps.  But nobody could have foreseen an earthquake of this magnitude, or infrastructure so destabilized by a tsunami as fast-moving and destructive as this one, or the double-punch effect occurring where it did and how it did.  There’s only so much you can plan because there’s only so much you can envisage.

And that’s the problem with the idea of planning to reduce risk.  You plan for what you know. Maybe you plan for something a little worse than what you’ve seen before — but even that is basically what you know, with a little juicing to make it livelier.   Even the pure-fantasy regulatory agency — the one with firewall immunity from influence by industry, perfectly competent engineering of its plans, and state-of-the-art technology — can’t foresee every eventuality.  Therefore, even the best planning won’t eliminate risk.

In the end, the question isn’t just how to keep the energy industry away from the regulators.   It’s how to live in a universe that isn’t completely predictable, no matter how good you think your “science” is.   And is ruled by random, implacable, and sometimes highly destructive nature.

Recently, Paul Sax reported at The Body on a plan to issue guidelines on the use of pre-exposure HIV prophylaxis (PrEP) using a combination of antiretroviral drugs, announced in the January 28 issue of CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. The effect of issuing guidelines is to endorse the procedure, which will help enrich pharmaceutical companies — the first being Gilead, which makes Truvada (combination of tenofovir + emtricitabine).

Here’s the CDC’s rationale for issuing interim guidelines now, with formal guidelines to follow:

CDC and other U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) agencies have begun to develop PHS guidelines on the use of PrEP for MSM at high risk for HIV acquisition in the United States as part of a comprehensive set of HIV prevention services…  [W]ithout early guidance, various unsafe and potentially less effective PrEP-related practices could develop among health-care providers and MSM … [including]

1) use of other antiretrovirals than those so far proven safe for uninfected persons;

2) use of dosing schedules of unproven efficacy;

3) not screening for acute infection before beginning PrEP or long intervals without retesting for HIV infection; and

4) providing prescriptions without other HIV prevention support (e.g., condom access and risk-reduction counseling).

Translation:  if  CDC or another USPHS agency doesn’t do something now, homosexual men might not buy  as much medication as they could.

What’s the impetus for this guidance?   Results of the iPrEx study, which was supported by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at NIH, were published in the New England Journal of Medicine in December.  The study purported to show a 44% reduction in HIV incidence among men who had sex with men who were taking Truvada prior to sexual exposure.  But the study was so deeply flawed, and the authors so cagey about their methods, that it’s  impossible to conclude that Truvada makes any difference to the chances of acquiring HIV.

As the iPrEx trial’s logo implies

iPrEx

it was multinational, involving almost 2500 HIV-negative people who were male (at birth) and adjudged to be at high risk of acquiring HIV because of their pattern of sexual activity.  It involved sites in Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, South Africa, Thailand, and the U.S. The comparison was between subjects taking Truvada and subjects taking a placebo.

The famous 44% reduction, however, was clearly not obtained in each site — and the authors don’t state which sites showed more effect.  More importantly, the reduced HIV incidence among those taking Truvada occurred only for a small subset of subjects who stayed on the drug for more than a year without becoming infected.  And it only lasted for about one additional year.

In other words, in the iPrEx study, people who took Truvada and remained HIV-negative for a year were slightly less likely to acquire HIV in the following year than were those who took placebo and remained HIV-negative.

Finally, even the small, second-year-only effect of Truvada is of questionable use to men in the U.S.  Because the study was based on men living in places with extremely HIV prevalences — higher than those in much of the U.S. — and involved men having a large number of partners, it provided essentially no evidence for any utility in the U.S.

As other trials of pre-exposure chemoprophylaxis are going on now, other companies’ products are likely to be included in the final version of the CDC guidelines.  So more corporations can benefit from the largesse of the Public Health Service.

Condoms are very effective at interrupting HIV transmission.  Obviously, you have to use them (properly) in order to benefit from that effect.  Because people don’t like them very much, condom promotion is a poor public-health strategy.

But as a matter of guidance for men who have sex with men, in what way is it better for the USPHS to suggest Truvada, which has to be used consistently even when you’re not having sex, probably won’t take effect for a year or so, and even then will only give you a minor reduction in the chances of acquiring HIV — rather than condoms?

Answer:  it is if you’re trying to promote profits for the pharmaceutical industry.

Still, it’s hard to avoid wondering:  is Wakefield right when he alleges that he’s being persecuted by the vaccine industry?

Last week, I discussed the BMJ article by Brian Deer asserting that Wakefield’s research was fraudulent, and the accompanying editorial supporting immunization.  At that point, I thought that the BMJ pieces were, together,  a one-off.

I was wrong.  In fact, it looks this week like the vaccine industry has armed some of its main warriors and sent them out to do battle.

The Battle Against Anti-Vaccinationism

In the Jan. 13th issue of the New England Journal of Medicine, two powerful chiefs, Gregory Poland and Robert M. Jacobson, claim that there’s an “age-old struggle” to make vaccines available.  Their aim is to vilify the “antivaccinationists” who “have done significant harm to the public health.” [Note the use of the holy article in this phrase, to signal just how sacred these warrior-priests hold "the" public health to be.]

The Poland-Jacobson piece is pure propaganda.  Theirs is a tale of heroic struggle on the part of ever-embattled Believers against the satanic forces of Antivaccationism — who have been trying “since the 18th century” to shake people’s faith in the vaccine gospel.  And nowadays the nasty antivaccinationists are using scarily modern forms of communications, such as TV and the Internet, in order “to sway public opinion and distract attention from scientific evidence.”

Wow:  TV and the web.  Sounds satanic alright.

I guess I shouldn’t be surprised that a couple of crusaders make their own work sound salvationist.  What troubles me is that they make it sound like they’re disinterested do-good-ers.

In fact, Poland and Jacobson are in bed with Big Pharma.  Poland runs the Mayo Clinic’s Vaccine Research Group.  Although as far as I can tell, Poland and Jacobson are not currently in the direct pay of the vaccine manufacturers, they and the VRG have benefited handsomely from vaccine makers’ largesse.

For instance, Poland’s and Jacobson’s work on human papillomavirus vaccine, as they acknowledge in a 2005 Mayo Clinic Proceedings paper, was funded by Merck, and their co-workers were Merck employees.  Later, in conjunction with a continuing medical education module on meningococcal vaccine in 2009, Poland disclosed the following ties:

Sources of Funding for Research: Merck & Co, Inc, Novavax, Inc, Protein Sciences Corp; Consulting Agreements: Avianax, LLC, CSL Biotherapies, CSL Limited, Emergent Biosolutions Inc, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co, Inc, Novartis Vaccines, Novavax, Inc, PowderMed Ltd

And on his disclosure form for this week’s NEJM article Poland acknowledges funding from Pfizer and Novartis for vaccine studies.

So when Poland and Jacobson write that our society “must continue to fund and publish high-quality studies to investigate concerns about vaccine safety,” they’re really talking about preserving their livelihood.  It’s very much in their interest to ensure a steady flow of such funding.

And when they say that “society must recognize that science is not a democracy in which the side with the most votes or the loudest voices gets to decide what is right,” they’re being completely disingenuous.  Because Poland and Jacobson know quite well why science is not a democracy:  in the type of research they do, it’s the big money that decides what is right.

A High Priest of Vaccine “Science”

Then there’s Paul Offit making the rounds.  Offit has been the subject of lots of attention by Age of Autism, most recently as a “denialist.” Offit probably profited somewhat from the licensing of Rota Teq vaccine, which he helped invent — although AofA’s allegation that he is therefore beholden to Merck seems unsubstantiated.

What’s obvious about Offit is that he is contemptuous of people who don’t agree with his version of truth.

Offit appeared on Lenny Lopate’s radio show in New York yesterday, and presumably will be appearing elsewhere.  His aim is to explain the “grave public health problem of vaccine avoidance.”  The “anti-vaccine movement threatens us all,” he says.  In fact, that’s the subtitle of his new book, Deadly Choices.

Where Poland and Jacobson are militant and sanctimonious, Offit sounds a note at once sentimental and officious.  It’s “tragic” that there have been measles outbreaks because of parents refusing to have their kids vaccinated, he says.  And the problem is that people just don’t understand science.  In fact, Dan Olmsted at AofA gets it quite right when he critique’s Offit’s blinkered version of science:

Anyone concerned about [possible harms of vaccination] fits Offit’s definition of anti-vaccine, because vaccines don’t cause any of them, because Paul Offit says so, a solipsism that is really quite breathtaking: “[B]ecause anti-vaccine activists today define safe as free from side effects such as autism, learning disabilities, attention deficit disorder, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, strokes, heart attacks, and blood clots — conditions that aren’t caused by vaccines — safer vaccines, using their definition, can never be made.”

I had the same reaction to Offit’s self-important — and, to my mind, unscientific — claims.  Offit shows no interest in the open inquiry that marks science.  People who don’t agree with him are uneducated, poorly informed, maybe just stupid.  And, of course, dangerous.

“Tragic” Consequences of Unbelief

On the Lopate show, Offit resorted to the now-common formula of the “tragic” consequences of parents’ belief in Andrew Wakefield.

What’s the tragedy, exactly?   It’s true that there have been outbreaks of measles in the British Isles that have been traced to parents’ refusal to have their children immunized.  An excellent review in BMJ in 2006 provided some of the data for the U.K. — including that one child died in a 2006 measles outbreak that was related to poor immunization coverage.  A few children died in Ireland in 2000.  A CDC account of a measles outbreak in California in 2008 reports that it hospitalized a few children, although none died.

It would be great if nobody ever died from an infection that could be prevented in any way.  It’s surely tragic to the parents of a child who dies from a preventable infection.   The sympathies of each of us should go out to such parents, as to those whose kids are killed by bad drivers, sports injuries, or infections for which there’s no vaccine.

But in what sense is one child’s death more of a collective “tragedy” for all of us than the other deaths that go unremarked every day?   Why is it tragic when one child dies of a vaccine-preventable infection and not when a lot of them die of poorly regulated handguns or as troops fighting wars that never endanger our leaders, only our young?

The Ramp-up of Aggression by the Vaccine Crusaders

Why are the vaccine warriors rampant now?  Perhaps the vaccine makers are terrified that the low uptake of H1N1 flu vaccine despite all the hype in 2009, along with low MMR compliance in some places (the U.K. especially), means that their profits are going to slide.  Maybe their friends, like Offit and Poland, are worried that reduced uptake of vaccines will translate into diminished research funding or fewer conferences in delicious places.

Or maybe the vaccine industry finds Wakefield so obstreperous that they can’t rest until he is destroyed. Wakefield’s no choir boy, but he might not have realized just how much control the pharmaceutical industry can exert in the U.K.

In a review essay in last week’s New York Review of Books, Simon Head points out that Big Pharma is “the only major segment of the British economy that is both world-class and an intensive user of university research,” and implies that it exerts control over both the substance and volume of U.K. research productivity, especially in medicine.  Head sees reason to believe that Pharma will “tighten its hold over scientific research in the UK” in the future.

It’s Not a War

There need be no either-or about vaccines.  If our society can live with guns and automobiles (together accounting for roughly 50,000 American deaths a year), if we tolerate alcohol, processed foods, acetaminophen, high-rise construction, and all the other things that occasionally cause harm but mostly contribute to the way of life we prefer — then we can stop calling it “tragic” when a few parents don’t have their kids immunized.

Because to call one measles death “tragic” is to further the vaccine warriors’ campaign — the campaign that pretends to be on behalf of science or healthy kids, but is really fought to protect the fortunes of vaccine makers.

The campaign protects the power of shiftless public officials who claim to be protecting the public from harm when they serve up millions of taxpayer dollars to vaccine manufacturers for barely useful vaccines (H1N1 2009), or for vaccines that are undoubtedly helpful but might be harmful in some cases and haven’t been thoroughly examined (HPV vaccine).  And who, to this day, won’t even consider the very good question that Andrew Wakefield posed in the 1990s:  is it a good idea to give kids three immunizations in a single preparation?

I had my child immunized when she was the right age for that.    But I’m not certain that absolutely everyone has to do the same.  Neither are the courts, which is why they allow exemptions from immunization for personal belief.

I don’t think measles is a menace to civilization.  I know that only a very tiny percentage of children who contract measles get dangerously sick from it, that flu vaccine doesn’t work for everyone (and isn’t an effective public health measure to stop flu outbreaks even though it can protect individuals from illness), and that varicella vaccine can make the problem of shingles worse even though it reduces the problem of chicken pox.  And so forth.

I mean that immunization is complex and fraught.  Not everyone can be expected to agree with every vaccine recommendation.   Even while some people are opposed to vaccination and refuse to immunize their kids, life will go on, and society will continue to thrive, and Paul Offit can continue to say arrogant things about “science.”

So, could someone please call off the crusade?

Or is it the vaccine-autism connection that’s supposedly being interred?

Probably both.

The BMJ opened the proceedings this week by publishing journalist Brian Deer’s investigative piece on the original Wakefield study of MMR vaccine and autism (Wakefield’s study was published in Lancet in February 1998).   That report had already been repudiated by Wakefield’s coauthors, and retracted in 2010 by the Lancet‘s editors after investigation of Wakefield’s procedures.  Wakefield is no longer allowed to practice medicine in the UK.   The Deer article was a parting shot.

An accompanying editorial by Fiona Godlee, Jane Smith, and Harvey Marcovitch, BMJ editors, was a well-taken and circumspect attempt at restoring confidence in measles immunization — on which, in their view, the work of Wakefield and colleagues had cast a shadow.  The editors might not be right in blaming the 1998 Wakefield study for contemporary parents’ reluctance to get their kids immunized, but their aim is to make a reasonable, if arguable, public health point.   To my reading, they haven’t got much of an axe to grind.

But then the whetstones began to turn.  Jonathan Adler at Volokh cheers, wondering if now the “vaccine-autism charade” will end.  Nick Gillespie is also celebratory, albeit more sedately, at Reason‘s blog.   

At Age of Autism, John Stone tries to undermine the journalist (Deer) who wrote the fraud story.  Stone is so rabid, and so ad hominem, in his attempts to destroy Deer that he manages to touch on not a single one of the reasons why it remains impossible to rule out a link between vaccines and autism.   Elsewhere at AofA, the UK group CryShame’s response is published; it too focuses on Deer’s methods, not the substance.

Evidently, substance is nobody’s concern here.  It’s about how news gets made.  Gary Schwitzer, a really sharp observer of the journalism scene, notes that journalists made Wakefield’s reports newsworthy back in their day, and are now “playing a key role in uncovering and dismantling” the story.

The vaccine-autism connection is news because it continues to get everyone riled up.

The defenders of vaccination (to judge by their vigorous celebration every time some further insult is visited on Andrew Wakefield) keep hoping that the suspicions of such a connection will go away.

The skeptics about governments’ medical policing of private lives invoke the possibility that vaccines are associated with a really high profile Bad Thing — like autism — to further their case.

The people who are crying out for an explanation for why so many kids function autistically remain unsatisfied.  (It’s not hard to see why they can’t get satisfaction:  policy makers, invested in mass immunization, don’t want to do the studies that would really find out whether or not the multiple vaccinations that kids are supposed to undergo today might be related to neurological changes.)

Of course, all of that has to do with the substance of the problem.  And what we’re seeing here, with Wakefield, with the revocation of his medical license last year, with this week’s fraud charge, and so on, isn’t substance at all.  It’s gloating or it’s grumbling.  Really, it’s not new.  But it’s news.

The News describes the experiment very simply:

[New York City's] Department of Homeless Services split 400 struggling families into haves and have-nots.

The “haves” get rental assistance, job training and other services through a program called Homebase.

The other half … were dubbed the “control group” and shut out of Homebase for two years. Instead, they were handed a list of 11 agencies and told to hunt for help on their own.

The aim of the experiment, allegedly, is to find out whether Homebase, a $23 million program, is effective.  The city’s Commissioner of Homeless Services told the Times that

When you’re making decisions about millions of dollars and thousands of people’s lives, you have to do this on data, and that is what this is about.

(If you thought that what it’s about, for a commissioner meant to deal with homelessness, is making sure that people have homes — you were so wrong.  Silly you.)

To make matters worse: what’s being tested is a program whose effectiveness the city has already asserted. As Mike, who blogs brilliantly on this and many related topics at SLO Homeless, notes:  the 2010 Mayor’s Management Report, issued in September, claimed that Homebase helped “ninety percent of clients in all populations receiving prevention services to stay in their communities and avoid shelter entry.”

So, to make sure this is clear:  New York City is deliberately denying a couple of hundred families access to an existing homelessness-prevention program that it has already declared to be highly effective.

The scenario is identical to one that kicked up storms of controversy in the medical-research world in the 1990s (neatly contextualized and summarized here):   experiments were conducted in Africa and southeast Asia supposedly to test the effectiveness  of an already-proven preventive regimen, AZT.  Administered during pregnancy, it reduced the likelihood of mother-to-fetus or mother-to-infant transmission of HIV.  In the poor-country experiments, half of the women enrolled got the effective regimen; the other half got placebo.

In other words, if you were pregnant and infected with HIV and you had had the wisdom to live in the U.S., you got a treatment that protected your infant from infection.  If you lived in a poor country you got:  studied.

There’s something about poor people, and especially about poor women with kids, that seems to make them smell like catnip to the always evidence-hungry technocrat cats.

Want to run a placebo-controlled trial?  Find something that already works (antiretrovirals, homelessness prevention, or, in other circumstances, syphilis treatment, TB prevention, etc.), then find a few women with kids who need it — then tell them you’ll flip a coin.  Heads, they get what they need; tails… well, too bad.

I’m a scientist.  I believe that evidence can be helpful.  Sometimes, it’s crucial.  When you’re truly unsure whether to pick prevention A or prevention B, data can help you to choose right and avoid harm.  That’s the great promise of science.

But sometimes the appeal to evidence is baleful — like here in Bloomberg’s New York, where evidence on homelessness is just a way of furthering the aims of the technocracy.  Which always means that some people will avoid harm.  Others will pay the price.

And the others are, so often, poor women with children.

Today, it would be closer to the truth to say that tragedy only counts if it can be diagnosed.   And diagnosis only counts if it’s biological.

That’s been the story of  the conversation about autistic children, and the implication of so-called mitochondrial dysfunction.

Deficiencies of energy metabolism have been rumored in association with the autistic picture for a while now, and emerged in the Hannah Poling case a few years ago.  They were given a boost by a small European case series (abstract here, PDF here) published in 2005 in Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology.  (The authors of the article gave their paper the deceptive title “Mitochondrial dysfunction in autism spectrum disorders:  a population-based study,” even though the research involved no population at all, just 11 kids.  But business is business.)

Another boost came this week with the publication in JAMA of a methodologically careful study of  energy metabolism in 10 California children diagnosed with autism, contrasted with 10 children drawn from a well-matched sample of comparable control children.   The new study found reduced oxidative activity in mitochondria — the tiny energy-chain entities inside cells that produce chemically based, biologically derived power for the cells’ functions.  The reduced oxidative activity was present in most of the 10 autistic children, and they showed a much-altered mean energy metabolism on several different measures.

Thus, altered energy metabolism at the cellular level has been documented in a small handful of children diagnosed with autism.  It seems not to be present in all children with autistic diagnoses.  It might be a result of autistic behavior rather than a cause, or a bystander phenomenon of some kind.  Or it might be a feature that hastens diagnosis (in the ones who have the unusual metabolic pattern, it has not been shown to precede the diagnosis) without actually playing any predisposing role.  Indeed, the authors of the JAMA paper remark that the

mitochondrial dysfunction observed in this preliminary study performed with children presenting with full syndrome autism may or may not indicate an etiological role.

But this minor and still untested finding on mitochondrial energetics, still not of any self-evident significance regarding the cause of autistic behavior, has created a major stir.  Medscape weighed in.  Business Week ran a story written by HealthDay reporter Jenifer Goodwin.  And it’s no surprise that the story has been front page news at the autism blogs, like Age of Autism and Autism Speaks.

So it seems safe to say that we’re looking at the third coming of a fact.

That some children engage with the world differently than do most kids was the first discovery, an old discovery (some think the 18th-century Wild Child of Aveyron was autistic).  It was codified in 1910 when  the psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler labeled one of the varieties of childhood schizophrenia “autistic.”  Identification.

Next came diagnosis – beginning with Hans Asperger in 1938 and Leo Kanner in 1943.   In the grip of modernity, slow acquisition of words, quirky communication, fixity of focus, failure to multitask, preoccupation with parts rather than wholes, and so on, are no longer signs of diabolical possession, thankfully.  But neither do they signal a broadened sense of what human experience is like.  They’re just signs of disease.

Diagnosis has allowed all sorts of theories to summon support:  about parenting, about the toxic environment, about thimerosal in vaccines, or about immunization itself.  Autism is the diagnosis that lets people express their misgivings about modernity.

Now we’re seeing the beginning of step 3:  biologization.

If autism is to stand up to 21st-century modernity, it has to have a biological basis.  Otherwise it will go the way of the obsolete disorders of old, like neurasthenia, hysteria, or frigidity.  The research on mitochondrial dysfunction in California won’t be the last or the only big-dollar expenditure aimed at finding a biochemical basis for the diagnosis of autism.   And there’ll be DNA studies, too.

The sad thing is that the only good way for troubled parents to get services for their children is to have the kids diagnosed, and to help to get them labeled as biologically off-kilter (Autism Speaks was one of the sponsors of the study just published in JAMA).  Get them labeled as dysfunctional, to use the term of art.

There’s no percentage in betting on need, or social disadvantage, or just plain poverty as an impetus to free up funds and services.  The need doesn’t count if there’s no dysfunction.   Your event doesn’t count as world-historic without a biological basis now.  First as tragedy, then as diagnosis, then as biology…

Autism, ADHD, obesity, addiction — each time our society is confronted with a problem it can’t solve or an irritation it can’t salve, we feed the problem into the medical establishment’s diagnosis mill.  Then we turn it over to the biologists to put some science on it.

Once the problem has a name and a diagnosis and a biological mishap to it — then we can see it.

Finger pointing about the “cause” of the outbreak — finger pointing at Nepalese peace keepers, the UN mission, relief workers, or Haitian health workers — is a way of avoiding the fundamental problem:  insufficient political will to create working infrastructure for poor countries.  Haiti being the leading example, the cholera outbreak being the case study.

Given how shaky the living arrangements have been for many Haitians since the January earthquake, given the pre-existing destitution and the anemia of efforts to fix that, it’s a tribute to the Haitian health system that cholera didn’t break out until October.  It might have been much sooner.

But now that cholera is spreading, it seems that more energy is going into using the outbreak to whip up political animus in, and about, Haiti than to figuring out how to make sure it doesn’t happen again.

This week, the politicization of the cholera outbreak seems to get worse by the day (Crawford Kilian’s cholera coverage at H5N1 continues to keep abreast of both the cholera outbreak and the political uses it’s being put to).   I talked to John Hockenberry and Celeste Headlee about this on The Takeaway yesterday, pointing out that the problem is social crisis, not Nepalese troops.  It’s poverty, lack of adequate sanitation, poor access to clean water — not foreigners.

Here’s the segment of The Takeaway:

In contrast to the misleading headline of Reuters’ piece, what Ms. Fox covers is not the (pseudo) mystery of “who brought cholera to Haiti?”  It’s the effort by CDC, the Haitian health ministry, and PAHO to determine whether the outbreak likely started from a single source or multiple ones.

The findings are reported in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report this week:  Haitian cases all carried Vibrio cholerae of the O1 serogroup, serotype Ogawa (a very common strain), with DNA of a single pulse-field gel electrophoresis pattern.  Because of the propensity for mutation or recombination events in the reproduction of bacteria, it would be extremely unlikely for different people to be carrying bacteria with the identical PFGE pattern unless they had all been exposed to an identical strain.  [N.B.  Strictly speaking, cholera is not an infection:  the illness results from poisoning by V. cholera in the intestine, not from actual infection of tissue.  Therefore I write "exposed to" rather than "infected by."]

Based on the findings so far, CDC and its partners concludes that the outbreak probably began with a single strain.

Did this strain arrive in cholera recently, or has it been around for some time and only recently came to attention as a cause of mass morbidity and mortality?  Did it arrive in a person and contaminate the environment via feces, or arrive in food or water?  Was there a single initiating exposure, or did cholera arrive inside multiple people or food items?  As Fox points out, the study can’t answer these questions.

It makes sense to seek information on how the outbreak got started in order to plan for better systems to prevent future outbreaks.  CDC is on the right track here.

But by calling this a whodunit, Reuters is pandering to people who want to inflame tempers, not spreading information about what can be done to make Haiti healthier.  Shame on you, Reuters.

The startling results of this study suggest that when left unchecked texting and other widely popular methods of staying connected can have dangerous health effects on teenagers.

(Aside to Dr. Frank:  C’mon, doc.  Do you not know that “hyper text” is already a term in wide usage? Do you know how sometimes there are underlined words, most often in blue, that, if you click on them with your mouse then you are magically transported to another website?  That’s it.  Do you realize that any teens who aren’t already laughing at you for your transparently hysterical research agenda have cause to snicker over your misuse of contemporary language?  But back to my point…)

The subject of a press release by the American Public Health Association, the study claims that teens who text  more than 120 times a day are, compared to light texters:

• 41% more likely to have used illicit drugs
• Nearly 3.5 times more likely to have had sex
• 90% more likely to report having had four or more sexual partners

The results were based on a survey of over 4,000 high school students in the midwest.

The paper, presented at the annual meeting of the APHA, is yet another indicator of the association’s redirection — from promoting social reform to becoming the Popular Front for the Promotion of Family Values.   The news media complied with the APHA’s mongering by publicizing Frank et al.’s findings, for instance here, and so did the usually serious WebMD.

Research like this is meant to say both “childhood is deadly” and “children are dangerous.”  Teenagers have sex, it says, and you grownups shouldn’t take that lightly.

The connection of teen sex and teen drug use to cell phones, iPhones, or the Internet appeals to people who think there is something new, and terrifying, about modernity.  As Carl Phillips notes over at ep-ology, it’s a way of saying “Beware the scary new technology!  It is causing teens to interact.”

Of course, there’s also a race, class, and sex angle:  The study reported that excessive texting (along with what the authors call “hyper-networking,” meaning excessive use of social network sites) is more common among girls, racial minorities, and kids whose parents have less education. One more reason to be suspicious of the poor and the dark-of-skin, says the Popular Front.

Especially, the APHA wants us to beware of girls.  The public health industry — the folks who reminded your grandparents that female sexual desire spreads disease with posters like this one, from the ’40s:

Source: U. of Minnesota, Social Welfare History Archives

… now tell us to watch out for girls who text.

Mike Stobbe at AP, covering the report, did a (typically) good job of looking deeper into the question.  About half of kids between the ages of 8 and 18 text each day, and the ones who do average 118 texts per day. While texting while driving is a really bad idea, texting about sex isn’t uncommon (Stobbe points out).  Unlike texting while driving, nobody dies from it.

Public heath shouldn’t be a matter of, as the Frank report put it, wake-up calls for parents.   Childhood really is dangerous in some places (Somalia, Congo, and Haiti come to mind, in case physician-researchers currently obsessed with sex amongst American teenagers are looking for something useful to do with their medical skills).  But it isn’t in America.   Sex, even between teenagers, really isn’t very scary.   There are a lot of things we adults could do to make the country and the world less miserable, but spying on our kids isn’t among them.

But to understand why the story is wrong means recognizing a weakness of science as it’s often practiced today.

Wade’s claim is based on two papers published this month.  A relatively well done study by Haensch et al. in PLoS Pathogens earlier in October tested human remains from well-identified plague pits — burial sites for medieval plague victims — in different parts of Europe.  Researchers amplified DNA sequences of the plague bacterium, Yersinia pestis, at specific genetic loci, and tested to see whether the DNA matched known sequences of contemporary Y. pestis genes.

The findings published in PLoS suggest that the Black Death and perhaps subsequent waves of plague in Europe were indeed caused by Y. pestis — which would tend to debunk the theory proposed by some British researchers that the Black Death was some kind of viral hemorrhagic fever outbreak.  And they suggest that there were at least two widely different Y. pestis strains involved in different parts of Europe.  Here’s a bit of the abstract:

[O]n the basis of 17 single nucleotide polymorphisms plus the absence of a deletion in glpD gene, our aDNA results identified two previously unknown but related clades of Y. pestis associated with distinct medieval mass graves. These findings suggest that plague was imported to Europe on two or more occasions, each following a distinct route.

The main weakness here is that DNA could not be amplified from all of the plague pits the researchers studied, but after using alternative means to test the DNA debris against contemporary gene sequences the investigators concluded that the absence of genetic material reminiscent of one strain of Y. pestis was evidence that that strain was not in play in that part of Europe at the time.  Probably right, but stretching the available evidence.

It’s a common mistake, alas.  To paraphrase Karl Popper:  just because you see DNA from white swans and don’t see any DNA from black swans, doesn’t mean that black swans don’t exist.

Still, the PLoS paper is persuasive that more than one strain of the plague bacterium was circulating, and probably causing deaths, in the plague period in Europe.  Of course, it says nothing about China.

So where does the NYT reporter get his headline-grabbing story?  A paper to be published in Nature Genetics online (still embargoed at the time I’m writing, but a summary appears here) states that the sequences of plague DNA amplified from plague pit remains, as well as contemporary isolates, can be placed on a molecular clock because of the occurrence of unique mutations.  Winding the clock backward, the researchers conclude that the Ur plague organism, ancestor of all Y. pestis, came from the far east.

The molecular biology may be unimpeachable, but the inferences about history aren’t supportable by molecular evidence.  That might explain why they’re almost certainly wrong.

The problem (scientists, I hope you’re listening!) is that you may know very well what you know, but you can never know what you haven’t seen.  The hereditary tree has its roots in China.  Here is one proposed by some of the same authors in a 2004 PNAS paper:

In this set-up, isolates of Y. pestis from China seem closest to the primordial strains.

But of course, the molecular clock doesn’t take account of strains that are no longer extant.  And ones that haven’t been unearthed.  The contemporary researchers don’t see them (or don’t know how to look), so they don’t exist.

It’s a bad mistake, inferentially.  And historically.  It’s where the NYT writer goes wrong.  Almost certainly, plague did not begin in China.  It began as an enzootic infection of small mammals in the uplands of central Asia.  This is the story convincingly relayed by William H. McNeill in Plagues and Peoples a generation ago, and none of the many accounts I’ve read since then has debunked it.

Plague would have had to begin in an ecosystem in which it could circulate at moderate transmission rates with little pathogenicity among small mammals (the natural host of the bacterium).  Exactly where it started remains open to question, but it was probably in the area that is now Turkestan/Uzbekistan.  With the development of trade between that region and China, intermixing of local (central-Asian) animals with caravan-accompanying rats would have allowed Y. pestis to adapt to the latter.

Quite possibly China was the source of the first human outbreaks of plague — because the river valleys of China were settled and agricultural (therefore offering feeding opportunities for rats as well as multiple opportunities for rat-human interaction) long before Europe was.  That fact probably accounts for the biologists’ (mistaken) belief that their early samples show that Y. pestis started out in China.

But plague began as — and remains — a disease of animals.  To acknowledge that human outbreaks in China preceded the human outbreaks in Europe (the Justinian plague that began in the mid-sixth century, the Black Death that began in the 1340s, and subsequent visitations) is not the same as saying that plague originated in China.

Which it didn’t.  Plague is an animal disease from Central Asia.  Plague’s long history is the usual one:  ecosystem change, trade, animal-human interactions, alterations in climate and economic conditions, and occasional opportunities for mass human illness.   (One world, one health.)

Above all, remember that science is only capable of drawing conclusions about what scientists can observe.  Don’t be taken in by hair-raising stories.  Even in the NY Times.

Early this month, a couple of friends, thinking they might splurge on a downtown hotel to celebrate their tenth wedding anniversary, were soliciting bed bug reports before choosing where to stay.  And at a family gathering last week, one young man — recently graduated from an elite college, an intellectual usually given to ironic mockery of the nuttier trends evident in the generation that still uses e-mail — told me that while he’s afraid of bees and doesn’t like mosquitoes, bed bugs really terrify him.

Bed bugs are unpleasant.  Their bites can itch.  Their feces and molted shells can set off asthma attacks or other allergies.  It’s sensible to avoid them, and get rid of them if they’re in your home.  I wrote a few months ago that it makes perfect sense that health authorities do something to limit bed bug woes.

But if you ask me what insects worry me most as a public health professional, I certainly wouldn’t say “bed bugs.”  Ticks, especially as Lyme disease spreads geographically.  Phlebotomine (sand) flies, as leishmaniasis becomes a more serious problem.  Mosquitoes, always.   Bed bugs are far from the top of my list.

The Aedes mosquitoes that carry yellow fever, dengue, rift valley fever, and chikungunya viruses, are most troubling right now.  Ae. aegyptii most of all, of course, but increasingly Ae. albopictus.

An extensive outbreak of rift valley fever in South Africa produced dozens of human cases earlier this year, and seems to be continuing among livestock.  An epidemiologist friend in Europe told me a few weeks back that he and other European disease control specialists, already concerned about dengue and yellow fever, are looking at RVF exposures in the southern part of the continent — a worrisome finding for a virus that has primarily been African.   The European Center for Disease Control is, appropriately, concerned about the establishment of Ae. albopictus in Europe.

Ditto chikungunya, which as produced 33 cases in Delhi, India, this year, possibly including an illness in the city’s mayor.

Dengue  demands control most pressingly of all.  Although the CDC is busily advising Americans not to worry (“Nearly all dengue cases reported in the 48 continental states were acquired elsewhere by travelers or immigrants,” its info page reads), there is active spread through much of the Caribbean basin — see the map at Dengue Watch, for instance.  The Mexican ministry of health reports dengue transmission in areas bordering the U.S.  There has already been an outbreak in Texas (in 2005).  And other highly industrialized countries with strong surveillance and control systems are experiencing dengue cases, including the first report of domestic transmission within France this summer.

(Hats off to Crof at H5N1, who has been following both chikungunya and dengue assiduously.)

The expansion of the range of Ae. albopictus, a secondary but by no means ignorable vector for dengue, makes the geographic extension of these pathogens worthy of concern.

With climate changing, trade routes always in flux, area spraying of insecticide disfavored because of environmental considerations, and of course mosquitoes evolving to take advantage of new niches, it seems unlikely that North Americans can go on counting on the mere improbability that virus and vector will coincide.

Mosquito control programs are in place, and U.S. authorities expend considerable effort at controlling Ae. aegyptii in Puerto Rico.  But the West Nile fever outbreak of 1999 and its subsequent extension in North America reveals the porousness of mosquito control.

Mosquitoes are much more worrisome than bed bugs.

Haiti today: in the mouth of death.  Not just Haiti, of course.  Deadly, gruesome, and hard to stop, cholera seems emblematic of the many failures that preceded the earthquake and have been exacerbated since.  We Americans are paying attention to Haiti lately — because of the earthquake; because of proximity; or because however bad things are here, what with high unemployment and poor economic prospects, Haiti conveniently reminds us of what we’re not.  But really much of the world, of the dollar-a-day world, is in the mouth of death much of the time.

With cholera, the relief agencies are hard at work.  Ansel Herz, a freelance journalist who blogs at Mediahacker, writes that there have been five cholera deaths in Port-au-Prince as of this morning, although the authorities say those people came to the capital from elsewhere and that cholera isn’t yet spreading in Port-au-Prince.  Still, cholera mortality is over 200 nationally.   Herz describes the earnest efforts of aid workers.  But his reportage, along with that of the Miami Herald, the NY Times, and others, also reveals the shortcomings of relying on aid organizations to contain the complex problems — of which cholera is the latest.

Partners in Health, to my mind the most earnest and committed of the aid organizations, is compiling reports on the spread of cholera and, of course, trying to do something about it.  But here’s the problem: if it’s the aid workers who are trying to stop cholera, it’s too late.  I don’t mean that they’ll fail; I mean that there should have been infrastructure in place to make sure cholera doesn’t break out at all.  And if there’s no such infrastructure, cholera will happen again, however well it’s halted this time.

It’s hard to escape the image, provided by Herz, of a new water tank installed near Cité Soleil by the International Organization for Migration — which stands empty, because nobody has provided clean water to fill it.

This is the problem with aid:  of course there must be organizations, like Partners in Health or MSF, that provide relief to the suffering.  But if there’s no support, or demand, for permanent public health infrastructure, the aid workers will always be scrambling to keep up with crises, and the crises won’t stop happening.

In the New Yorker this month, Philip Gourevitch takes a skeptical view of humanitarian aid (abstract here; full article requires subscription).  He summarizes the message of Dutch journalist Linda Polman sympathetically:

Now, Gourevitch is talking specifically about crises created by political conflict.  But something of this dilemma pervades the problem of relief.  Public health is political.  It takes political will — not just oral rehydration therapy — to install water supplies and sewage systems, and housing with running water even for the poor.

Canada is going to send a million dollars to Haiti to help with the cholera problem (thanks to Crof at H5N1 for picking that up).  No doubt the U.S. will outdo its neighbor in looking mournful and concerned, and donating even more money.  But where’s the support for good government, and real public health, and necessary infrastructure?

What are we doing to promote the implementation of good public health? What are we doing to generate the political will to install even just the ordinary civil engineering works that we take for granted in America, but which would make a difference to the people who are living in the mouth of death?

What is the value of mass immunization of children against flu?

CDC claims that flu is dangerous for children and recommends immunization.  This claim seems to be based on the 50 to 150 pediatric deaths attributed to flu each year.  Preventing children’s deaths is a good reason to immunize those who might get very sick were they to be exposed to influenza.

But to translate a small number of possibly preventable deaths into a national policy of mass immunization?  That takes a special relationship with the vaccine manufacturers (see here and here and here and here for my comments on the collusion of officials with pharmaceutical interests).

The evidence that flu vaccine is effective in children is shaky, as Dr. Tom Jefferson’s exhaustive scrutiny of study data reveals.  Immunization of children seems to be weakly effective at reducing influenza-like illnesses in a general population, as Ritzwoller et al. showed in a study published in Pediatrics in 2005.  Partial immunization was ineffective — an issue worth considering if more than a single dose is required.

A few studies suggest that mass immunization of children is a way to prevent flu among young adults.

A community trial of immunization of children against flu, published in Vaccine in 2005, showed the ineffectiveness of immunizing children:  there was no reduction in acute respiratory illnesses among children in the concurrent or subsequent flu seasons, compared to communities where kids were not immunized.  There were slight reductions in ARI incidences among adults in the community where children were immunized — but this study wasn’t designed to show whether it was the immunizing of kids that protected the adults, or something else.

Similarly, a 2000 study published in JAMA by Hurwitz et al. showed that flu immunization of children in day care had the effect of reducing acute febrile illnesses among household contacts, compared to household contacts of daycare attenders who were not immunized (abstract here, full article requires subscription).  So immunizing children in daycare might help their parents to avoid getting sick.

In general, there’s suggestive evidence that mass immunization of small children against flu lessens the impact of flu outbreaks among young adults.

But few young adults die of flu.  It’s an annoying and sometimes serious illness.  The reason the public health authorities are interested in preventing flu among young adults isn’t to reduce suffering; it’s to keep them from staying out of work.  Should we immunize children so that the nation’s economic machine doesn’t slow down?

To put it a little differently:  should we shift large amounts of taxpayer money into the hands of pharmaceutical and vaccine manufacturers for the purchase of flu vaccine for children, basically in order to spare employers the loss in profits that would arise when workers stay home?

The news from ProPublica this week, that they and associated journalists found many cases of physicians taking money from big pharmaceutical companies, is alarming but comes as no surprise.  ProPublica’s new searchable database shows that the seven pharmaceutical companies (collectively accounting for 36% of market share) that provided data together made $257.8 million in payments to physicians.

What’s more alarming is that pharmaceutical companies often don’t even have to bother paying to push their products.  That’s especially true when the product is a vaccine.  Even flu vaccine, despite its limited and highly variable effectiveness.  Policy decisions made by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and CDC, practice decisions by medical organizations, research-grant funding, and so on are thoroughly organized around immunization.  Despite the evidence.