At H5N1 yesterday, Crof picked up the U.K. government’s announcement that it would sponsor an independent review of decision making in response to H1N1 swine flu last year.  The U.K.’s Minister of Health, Liam Donaldson, told WebMD that it is

vital that we learn from what we have seen in this pandemic, for the sake of those who find themselves tackling … the next. It is likely to be worse.

Anybody who claims to know what the next pandemic will be like is asserting a special ability to read mysterious auguries that nobody else can see.  So it’s all the more shocking that Donaldson goes on to obfuscate his own failure to ask critical questions by claiming to have been using expert predictions:

Would it have been acceptable to hide and conceal statistical projections provided by statistical modellers of international standing, even though releasing them publicly caused alarm in some quarters?

As if the flak he had taken last July were for a perfectly rational assertion, not an apocalyptic forecast — when he said that there could be 65,000 deaths from flu in Britain.  Donaldson later dropped the forecast to 19,000 deaths.  (The actual number was less than 400 during 2009, 457 to date.)

And as if Donaldson had not made the same off-base prediction back in October 2005, when he said that there would be an avian flu outbreak in the U.K. with 50,000 deaths.  That was Donaldson’s excuse to use public money to purchase two and a half million doses of antivirals for stockpiling.

As if, that is, the problem were that people are just benightedly opposed to science — not genuinely concerned about malfeasance.

To its credit, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe continues its investigation of decision making around the H1N1 outbreak response, holding a second public hearing on Monday.  Briefs of experts’ statements at the first hearing, back in January, are available here, and links to full statements and video are at the PACE site here.

Some of my friends and colleagues in public health wonder if this kind of questioning comes from misunderstanding the seriousness of flu and others are fearful that it will diminish the authority of public-health physicians.  A few, but too few, back the redoubtable Tom Jefferson, who has been questioning the reliance on flu vaccine for a long time.  Shouldn’t scientists — especially scientists — question authority?

Officials’ legitimacy ought to be diminished if they’re not serving the public.  Particularly when their decisions mean that private companies benefit from taxpayers’ monies.  Clearly, the transfer of funds is what happened with the H1N1 flu response.  Was it based on sound decision making?  More transparency would be a good thing.

Now that the Council of Europe and the U.K., are investigating official responses to H1N1 flu, could we please hear from the United States?

As New Scientist points out, the GMC’s finding removes any impediment to charging Wakefield and two of his colleagues with misconduct.  GMC may rule on that score in a few months, according to the BBC.

By and large, the talk about the verdict hasn’t been about the substance of the contentious vaccine-autism link.  At Autism Science Foundation, Alison Singer (the group’s president) writes that

Anti vaccine autism advocates continue to see Wakefield as a hero who remains willing to take on the establishment and fight for their children.  In the meantime, Wakefield’s actions have had a lasting negative effect on children’s health in that some people are still afraid of immunizations. In some cases, the younger siblings of children with autism are being denied life saving vaccines. This population of baby siblings, already at higher risk for developing autism, is now also being placed at risk for life threatening, vaccine preventable disease, despite mountains of scientific evidence indicating no link between vaccines and autism. This is the Wakefield legacy.

On the other side, Generation Rescue writes in support of Wakefield at Age of Autism.  GR isn’t as cogent as Singer, but brings up the point that tends to complicate this and most discussions of autism:    “Do you think pharmaceutical companies have too much influence in the laws, policies, and regulations of our government?  We do.”

Liz Ditz provides a great service, compiling blog posts pro-Wakefield and, separately, those criticizing Wakefield and/or supporting the GMC’s decision.  (As of today, the Wakefield critics seem to have been more prolific.)

Thursday’s BBC report concludes with a graphic showing a decline in MMR coverage in the UK between 1996-97, when it stood at around 90%, and 2004, when it bottomed at around 80%.  Superimposed is the number of measles cases, which increased from a few dozen in 2005 to over 1200 in 2008.  The implication is that Wakefield’s report was somehow responsible for the drop in coverage in the late ’90s and that that decline led to a sharp uptick in measles incidence.  The graphic also implies that after Lancet retracted the original paper in 2004, public acceptance of MMR vaccine improved after Wakefield had been repudiated — but too late to prevent the measles upsurge.

Without supporting Wakefield’s methods, it’s still worth asking whether his 1998 paper should be held accountable for the decline in vaccine acceptability.  As early as February 1998, England’s Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre was reporting on the drop in MMR coverage from 1996 and ’97 data and BMJ reported in 2003 that the British trend was consonant with declines in MMR uptake in Europe generally:

[T]he experts say that coverage is substandard across Europe owing to a surprising lack of political will to implement an effective disease prevention programme, given the region’s stated goal to eliminate measles by 2007.

A decline in nationwide vaccine coverage to 80%  is probably less important as an explanation for increasing measles incidence in the U.K. than two other factors:  locally deficient MMR coverage and immigration from countries with lower vaccination rates.  In fact, measles increases in the UK seem to have been attributable to outbreaks in the northern part of the country and to high incidences among very young children in London, according the UK’s Health Protection Agency.

What’s to be learned from the Wakefield mess?

1. The role of pharmaceutical companies (including vaccine makers) in setting scientific agendas and moving policy remains an issue for many people.  Defenders of Big Public Health, like Mark Honigsbaum who writes an interesting piece in The Guardian today, tend to be dismissive of allegations that public health has become a game for technocrats in which corporations have too much sway.  But the defenders misunderstand those critiques.  The critics are not saying that government predictions are wrong where they should be right, nor that officials are on the take; the critique is this:  the relationship between profit makers and public agencies is sometimes awfully cozy and the attentiveness to real suffering is remarkably slight.

2. The pre-eminence of ethics boards, like Britain’s GMC, doesn’t always sit well.  With the Wakefield case, the MMR-autism controversy steps onto the slippery terrain of moral decision making in regard to research.  Many people don’t feel perfectly reassured about the ethics of medical practice when the overseers are themselves physicians, and the moral reasoning often seems restricted to “did the physician follow the rules?”

3. The stance of official agencies on autism doesn’t inspire confidence.  Vaccination is hard to exonerate as a cause of autism as long as the official approach is that autism is a disease, and by implication preventable — rather than a disability, which might or might not have a cause but whose sufferers, in either case, can be afforded decent lives.  To make matters worse, official agencies’ stance doesn’t defuse the controversy.  In the U.S. and U.K., they respond to anti-immunization claims with assertions about the safety of MMR in particular.  But they don’t seem to want to support the research that would test whether some children might be susceptible to damage incurred cumulatively by undergoing the numerous vaccinations that are scheduled for children today.  It’s unlikely that the scrutiny of immunization, or the controversy, is going to go away unless officials soften that stance.

We’ll probably hear more on this if the GMC rules to disbar Wakefield from practicing medicine.

At The Great Beyond, Daniel Cressey notes that Dr. Gerberding, while at CDC, was accused of promoting the Bush Administration’s agendas at the cost of scientific accuracy.  Naturally, now that she is heading for Merck, many are concerned about what looks like a cozy relationship between official agencies and pharmaceutical companies.

Merck says that its vaccine arm is worth $5 billion.  It “markets vaccines for 12 of the 17 diseases for which the U.S. Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices currently recommends vaccines,” according to the company’s press release.

Dr. Gerberding was close to the vaccine world as head of CDC. In fact, during her tenure there CDC’s   Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) called for the implementation of immunization against human papillomavirus and varicella zoster (chicken pox) virus and the agency pushed for expanded immunization against seasonal flu; within 10 months of her (January ’09) departure from CDC, the ACIP had issued recommendations for the use of anthrax vaccine and Cervarix and Gardasil vaccines against HPV.  Gardasil  is a Merck product.

But the problem is more than the “revolving door” metaphor implies.  To have a door there must be a wall — a clear demarcation between inside and out.   As if corporations (pharmaceutical companies among them) were outside of the official system, eager to get the ear of those inside.

Whereas it seems that there isn’t really much of a wall between official health agencies and big business at all.  To be an official today means taking a veritable oath of loyalty to corporate solutions.  The official has to deal in risk.  She has to be ready to sell risk as a kind of debt:  people should want to avoid risk, just as they avoid debt; but if their behaviors put them “at risk,” they can relieve it through “lifestyle” correction.  You can refinance if you know how.

The correction that allegedly relieves risk usually involves the use of better products. Cut out trans fats,  lower your cholesterol, elevate your mood, hop on a treadmill, lose weight, drink responsibly, get seasonal flu vaccine, get swine flu vaccine, wait patiently while the full-body scanners are used at the airport, eat more vegetables, wear sunblock, use hand sanitizer.  Health officials’ job is to get the means for personal risk reduction to the sorry at-risk population.  Have hand-sanitizer dispensers installed in public buildings.  Distribute condoms.  Publish recipes for healthy meals.

Notably, health officials are not supposed to argue for any of the things that would actually make a difference to the public’s overall health:  redress wealth disparities, provide excellent primary care for everyone (including immigrants), or build more decent and affordable housing.  When was the last time you heard a health official call for a campaign against poverty?

The official has to pitch personal risk reduction, in other words.  She has to be ready to support high-cost, individualized approaches to improving the public’s health — or well-being, which, Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick astutely notes at Spiked!, has replaced health as the main objective of modern Good Works .

Health officials keep faith with the dogma of risk avoidance.  Corporations preach risk reduction and peddle the wares by which people can restructure their lives — and avoid risk.  The wall separating government policy makers from corporate solutions gets more and more flimsy.

In dealing with the issue of a pandemic, if we stick to finding out how to block the infection completely, we may take extreme measures and, as a result, trigger a pandemic panic. Is there a way to avoid the pandemic without adding to people’s concern more than necessary? (full text of query here).

Since the question of balancing response with panic promotion is on many minds, this seems worth addressing.  But there’s the larger problem:  do we need even to ask this question?  Is there a crisis on hand with flu?

We think not.

“Marx claimed that great events of history occur twice, first as tragedy and then as farce,” we pointed out.

“The swine flu of 2009 certainly looks like a farcical replay of the great influenza outbreak of 1918…. [It's] not a funny farce…but death from contagion is a normal part of life in an unpredictable universe.”  A few thousand deaths in the course of six months is lamentable, certainly.  But it’s hardly out of the ordinary for flu.

The collusion of officials and big corporations has been allowed to construct a global crisis. The farce is that the imagined flu crisis will benefit exactly the people who constructed it.

The vaccine manufacturers can expect to see a great expansion of markets (don’t miss Brownlee and Lenzer on flu immunization in the Nov. ’09 Atlantic).

The antiviral-medication manufacturers, the makers of Tamiflu especially, are already bringing in plenty of money for a treatment that is useful in rare clinical situations but has never been shown to stop the spread of flu in large populations.

Officials benefit, too.  They claim they must roll out flu vaccine and provide frequent information updates in order to  “prevent panic.”  And then they’ll look like they’ve done a good job — since, there being no crisis, people are staying calm.

Read the full post here.

In this week’s Lancet, Dr. Steven Black, from Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, and colleagues present calculations of the expected frequencies of adverse consequences (abstract at link; subscription required for full text) likely to result from flu immunization.  The intent being to provide a basis for comparison, so that when events do occur following immunization, the vaccine won’t be blamed for them.

“Widespread beliefs that such false associations [of adverse events with vaccination] are true can and do disrupt immunization programs, often to the detriment of public health,” the authors write.

Testament to the persuasiveness of the rhetoric, an experienced and knowledgeable Reuters reporter is taken in.  Covering the Lancet article, Maggie Fox writes:

People have special fears about Guillain Barre Syndrome (GBS). a rare neurological condition that was linked to a 1976 U.S. swine flu vaccination campaign. Although no case of GBS was ever linked to the vaccine, a belief that the vaccine was worse than the illness remains widespread.

Not exactly.  At least 500 cases of GBS were linked to flu vaccine in 1976 — “linked” in the sense that Fox uses the word in the first sentence:  they occurred in vaccine recipients and were in excess of the number of GBS cases likely to have occurred had there been no adverse effect of vaccination.  Thirty-two of those cases were fatal.  That they were not “linked” in her second sentence means that the criteria for association have shifted, or can shift.

The method by which the 1976 GBS cases were linked to vaccine was exactly the same as the method Black and his colleagues propose as the test for determining whether adverse events are linked to the 2009 immunizations.

But if the nature of association can shift, then Black and company can play a double game.  On the one hand, no illness or death can be attributed to vaccine if it occurs at a rate less than that expected in normal times, sans vaccination.  That’s the premise of this week’s Lancet article.

On the other hand, no illness or death that occurs at a rate greater than expected can be attributed to vaccine unless there is some additional proof — not just statistics but, we imagine, pathology results from surgery or autopsy — demonstrating a link between vaccine and illness, or vaccine and death.  That’s the conclusion that the Reuters correspondent drew after talking with Black and company.

In other words, the vaccine “scientists” have already demonstrated that you’re wrong if you think vaccine has done anything bad.   Don’t bother alleging that vaccine harmed your child, spouse, or parent.

We have to wonder why physicians (the main authors of the Lancet paper are all MDs, as are the public health officials who are promoting mass immunization as a flu-control strategy) are mounting their defense of flu vaccination, when hardly anyone has been immunized yet.

And we have to wonder why physicians call themselves scientists when they don’t want to deal with evidence — only their own certainty that vaccination is a good public health strategy.  A strategy whose inevitable shortcomings they’re already defending.

Joshua Holland’s post at AlterNet yesterday tries to explain why H1N1 swine flu shouldn’t be cause for hysteria.  He puts this outbreak in the context of flu history and the threat posed by other, more harmful, conditions — malaria for instance.  Holland plays a little bit fast and loose with the numbers:  it probably isn’t accurate to extrapolate, from the number of confirmed flu deaths so far, to get a total number of deaths that will be caused by the swine H1N1 strain this year — more efficient spread in the  cities of the Northern hemisphere in the coming few months is likely to produce fatalities at a higher rate than the more sporadic outbreaks here in April and May.  And he’s overly critical of the media — a point brought out by Revere in a response to Holland at Effect Measure today.

But, as Frank Furedi has been telling us (recently in Erasmus Law Review, for example), try to explain how people’s deep-seated anxieties drive perceptions that risk is extraordinary and unprecedented (and contribute to demands for more and better high-cost technology to deal with it) and you get some people riled up.  Disappointingly, even Effect Measure, whose assessments are consistently level-headed and cogent, slips here, flashing the moral-entrepreneur card at Mr. Holland:

Joshua Holland has never cared for a critically ill person with Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS), which is often the terminal event for flu patients. So I’ll tell him. It doesn’t matter if it’s caused by bacteria (many are). Half of them die no matter what you do and no matter what intensive care unit you have available to you or what antibiotic or what computer controlled respirator. We still can’t do much.

Nobody thinks it’s a good idea to let people get ARDS, and Holland acknowledges that flu is a problem that should be dealt with.  But that’s not always enough.  Question the intensity of perceived risk or the need for all the technology, and you find this out fast.

But Revere is back on track when noting that lots of problems — including malaria — are horrendous and deserve attention, and probably don’t get it because they happen to people far away.

Where would the impetus to deal with global problems besides flu come from?  A global organization that can keep things in perspective would be useful.  Poor W.H.O. isn’t positioned to do that.  Yesterday’s flu advisory from W.H.O. emphasizes the use of antivirals (oseltamivir and zanamivir) to treat people with severe or possibly severe flu:

Early treatment is especially important for patients who are at increased risk of developing complications, those who present with severe illness or those with worsening signs and symptoms.

Yet, the W.H.O. also warns against hastening the development of resistance.  This agency gets a lot of flak for not doing more and for panic-mongering when it does do more.  But, really, it’s only doing its job:  offer advice, and support interventions when invited.  It isn’t consistent, naturally.  It can’t make binding policy.  It faces a limitless and essentially insuperable legitimation problem.  In a way, W.H.O.’s hardest job is simply to maintain its own legitimacy.

Still, in a world poised to interpret signs of illness as evidence of risk and eager for technical fixes to alleviate the sense of vulnerability risk instills, the W.H.O.’s announcements can seem authoritative — and look like beckoning to the drug makers.  A Reuters story yesterday is entitled “Early Use of Antivirals Key in H1N1 Flu: WHO,” and highlights the value of the two antiviral medications more than the caution W.H.O. wants to instill.

Meanwhile, agencies that should be making real policy are focusing on immunization.  In today’s Washington Post, Rob Stein reports on health care workers’ resistance to mandatory flu vaccination.  New York State made flu immunization mandatory early on, not only for salaried health care workers but for anyone — including medical and nursing students — who might come in contact with patients, and is putting teeth into the requirement with sanctions for refuseniks.  The state resorts to high  moral rhetoric to justify its policy.  The state’s health commissioner told Stein that “the rationale begins with the health-care ethic, which is: The patient’s well-being comes ahead of the personal preferences of health-care workers.”

And at CDC, the director is cautioning that there might be a rough start-up to the swine flu immunization campaign, as the first doses of vaccine will be made available in early October.  According to the NY Times, there should be 40 million doses of vaccine available by mid-October.

We wonder whether immunization will be of any public health value at all, by the time there’s enough vaccine that it can be offered to anyone other than health care workers and a few of the people who really need protection (young people, infants’ caregivers, and pregnant women, especially — DemFromCT’s round-up at DailyKos is always worth reading).  Given the rapidity of spread of flu — in 37 U.S. states, H1N1 spread is already regional or widespread; flu is spreading locally in 12 more states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. — and based on the usual course of flu outbreaks, it seems possible that this outbreak will peak by mid November.  There’s no knowing if that will be so, obviously.  Even if it is, immunization would continue to be useful to prevent severe cases among people who are likely to get very sick if infected.

But mass immunization would no longer be of much use in preventing further incidence of infection on a population level if high levels of acquired immunity are reached across much of the population by the time vaccine is widely available.

That’s the problem with relying on mass immunization as the centerpiece of public health response: as in the old joke about comedy, timing is everything.  In 1976, there was too much immunization, too soon.  It might turn out that this year, there’s too little, too late.  The dynamics of vaccine availability and the dynamics of flu spread have to be watched in tandem, and policy updated accordingly.

In any case, with vaccine at the center, the rest of the story — the complex environmental interactions that allow flu genomes to recombine, the trade in animals and feed that allow viruses to move around, the problems of affordability and immune status and competing viral subtypes, the health care facilities to handle severe cases, and so on — gets shoved to the side.

The NEJM paper argues that there would be health benefits of a tax on sugar-sweetened drinks — preferably to take the form of about a penny’s worth of excise tax levied per fluid ounce for any beverage containing “added caloric sweetener” (possibly to be defined as more than 1 g of sugar per 30 ml of beverage).

There’s much to be learned by the response.  The NY Times article, in its Business section Wednesday, was titled “Proposed Tax on Sugary Beverages Debated” but was generally slanted strongly in favor of the proposal.  If you read only the Times, you would think that objections to the tax come only from industry, which obviously has an economic interest in keeping sales of soda and sport drinks up by keeping the price down.

Shirley S. Wang at yesterday’s WSJ Health Blog adds some insight.  She points out that a 2-liter bottle of soda subject to the proposed tax, assuming the tax is entirely passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices, would still be much cheaper than a half-gallon of orange juice.

James Knickman of the NY State Health Foundation, writing in the NY Daily News last week, acknowledged that a soda tax would be essentially regressive, affecting the poor more powerfully than it does the wealthy.  He urges that

To counteract the soda tax’s regressive nature, revenue generated from the tax should go to health-related programs that benefit the poor – essentially putting the money back into their pockets. The revenue could be used for myriad initiatives, including subsidies for federal health reform – which is estimated to cost $1 trillion over the next 10 years – subsidies of fresh fruits and vegetables and other healthy foods in low-income community grocery stores, and food stamp increases for the purchase of fresh fruit and vegetables.

Knickman gets at one of the main purposes of a tax like this:  to get the poor to pay more of the costs of doing business.

But what isn’t being discussed, it seems, is the underlying logic.

First, there’s the assumption that obesity is uniformly and intensely bad.  The NEJM article begins with the statement “The consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages has been linked to risks for obesity, diabetes, and heart disease,” citing three articles — two of them authored, in part, by the same men who helped write this week’s soda-tax NEJM article.

What’s the point of the misleading opening in the NEJM paper (apart from getting some additional citations for the authors’ other work)?  The line suggests that drinking sugar-added beverages causes heart disease, yet no evidence suggests that.  Extra calories might add up to extra weight, some people (less than half) who have BMIs in the “obese” range report having diabetes, and diabetes can predispose to heart disease — but the NEJM authors make it seem that the sugar-heart connection is somehow direct.  The point is to create an impression of uniform and unavoidable harm. Who would want to be for heart disease?

The supposition that obesity is a terrible illness responsible for broad impairments to Americans’ health — a premise that the soda tax depends on –  is amply and cogently criticized in a series of posts by Sandy Szwarc at Junkfood Science (start here, for instance, or here).  In fact, epidemiologic studies point to a relatively small effect of obesity on mortality, primarily at the upper end of the weight-for-height (body mass index, BMI) scale.  A careful analysis of national survey data from a few years ago (Flegal et al., JAMA 2005) shows that the effect of high BMI on mortality has been declining over time and almost entirely vanishes after age 70.  In fact, some studies point to a protective effect of high BMI for older Americans.

And the claim that increasing the price of sugary beverages is a suitable inducement to Americans to change their behavior rests on standard — but flawed — economists’ analysis.  It’s rational choice theory come home to roost at your refrigerator door.  If you know that it’s going to cost two bucks and a half to replace that 2-liter bottle of root beer in the fridge, you’ll drink it more sparingly than if it cost only $1.29, the theory goes.  Here is where the regressive aspect comes in.  It’s primarily to the poor that coming up with $2.50 for a bottle of root beer seems substantially more difficult than $1.29.  Here, the soda tax reveals itself as just another attempt to get members of what is perhaps America’s most despised ethnicity — the poor — to “fix” their behavior.

And it all rests on a premise so common we might call it the American assumption:  that people only do things that might harm their health because they don’t know any better or because they can’t stop themselves.  Ergo, laws and rules, to make sure everyone knows where and how to draw the line — taxes, bans on smoking in restaurants (or, perhaps soon, parks) and bans on serving trans fats, removal into foster care of kids whose mothers use drugs, prosecution of parents whose kids are too fat, et cetera.  And of course, we need the products that will provide substitute enjoyment or relief.  Thus:  sugar-free soda, trans-fat-free potato chips, Prozac and other SSRIs, diet books, gyms, alcohol-free beer, and so on.

And we need it all to be wrapped up and rationalized in the language of avoiding risk.

Apparently, it isn’t plausible to the doctors and scientists who wrote the NEJM paper, or the legislators who are eager to institute the proposed soda tax, that people might drink too much soda — or eat too much, or smoke, or stay home and watch TV instead of jogging — with full awareness of the possible consequences.   In the risk-free zone of America as envisaged by the public health industry, only the insane and the uninformed would engage in “risky behavior.”

Nobody, in risk-free America, does anything because it feels good, knowing it might be harmful.  Nobody overeats because it brings her pleasure, nobody screws without a condom because it turns him on, nobody smokes because she had a bad day or a good day or because the day hasn’t started but it looks unpromising, nobody rides her bike without a helmet because she likes the feel of the wind in her hair.  It’s risky.  We all know better.

The libertarians think it’s big government you give up your private choices to, and the progressives think it’s big business.  But really, it’s neither — or both, working together.  And the public health and medical industries are complicit.  It’s not a conspiracy.  It’s more like religion.

“Deadly Choices” is heartbreaking.  It recounts a situation that was miserable, terrifying, and in some cases, fatal.  Fink reports that, among 45 Memorial Medical Center patients who died in the days during and immediately following the storm, 17 were deliberately administered lethal doses of morphine, sometimes along with a sedative, by physicians who apparently intended to hasten the patients’ deaths.  (Many of these 17 were patients at a hospital-within-the-hospital, a long-term care hospital under separate ownership that shared some staff with MMC.  At Slate today, Josh Levin discusses some of the troubling truths about the financing of long-term care hospitals, and Fink fills in some more of the blanks with a response at ProPublica.)

As Fink explained to Amy Goodman in an interview with Democracy Now earlier this week, at least one of the patients who were killed was not in extremis; he had not given up.  He was

“Ready to rock and roll, wanted to get out. And apparently, according to several people who later spoke with investigators, a discussion was had in which they talked about how they might get him out, and they decided that because he was so heavy and it was so hot and people had—I mean, just imagine….They had been going on no sleep for days, the medical workers. They were tired. They were terribly disturbed by all the suffering that they felt that they saw around them. And so, in this sort of moment, they apparently decided that [the patient] could not be brought down, could not be evacuated, that there was no way to get him out.”

The story of what happened at MMC is also profoundly disturbing.  It moves us to ask what sort of moral world physicians are expected, and allowed, to operate in.  And to wonder why moral boundaries should be so elusive to exactly the people who, with access to the means to both prolong life and hasten death, walk on morally fraught territory more often than anyone.

The horrifying events at MMC are especially  germane today — because they highlight a vexing question about health care reform that is very hard to answer:   Is our doctors’ job to alleviate suffering, or is it to improve health?

A favored guru on health care ethics, Ezekiel Emanuel, is explicitly in favor of the latter.  In “Justice and Managed Care” (subscription) in Hastings Center Report in 2000, he writes

“The allocation of health care resources should aim at and be justified by the improvement in people’s health…. The special aim or purpose of health care is curing disease, relieving pain and suffering, promoting public health, pursuing research to improve health, and so on.”

The “and so on” means that improving health — the obligation of a health care system, Emanuel asserts — amounts not just to the relief of pain and suffering but also to research and public health, and other tasks as well.  The relief of suffering might not be a priority, that is.  Or it might be a contingent priority, of importance for a limited time, or in certain circumstances — but not the only thing to worry about.

The point is not to vilify Emanuel.  He has opposed euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, so we should assume that he was as appalled by the actions of the chief physicians at MMC as others were.

But the Emanuelian sensibility is that the system in which physicians work is not meant to be dedicated to the relief of suffering alone.  Rather, it bears other duties as well:  a broad obligation to the public to promote health, and another obligation to contribute (through research) to the future of health care.

In this narrative, the physician is marshal of a campaign — not merely joined in a series of caring relationships with each of a number of patients, but commander of troops who have a long-term goal and territory to win.   By implication, the rights of patients might take second seat to the needs of the public, or to the desire to learn more about how to improve health in the future.  Patients shouldn’t be killed, this thinking goes, but they will have to understand that the prolongation of life is a luxury commodity to which physicians have the keys — and not everyone can have access.

The sense of the physician as a responsible manager, not merely a giver of care, connects with the utilitarian credo, “the greatest good for the greatest number” — a phrase that occurs three times in Fink’s piece as she strives to characterize the sensibility of MMC providers.

But the killings at MMC should, at the very least, make us ask whether it’s a good idea to have doctors making decisions about the greater good — or whether we want them to recognize individual persons above all.

Alex Jones reports that the proposal was ratified early this month, over the objection of the NY State Nurses’ Association.

Word on the street is that NYC’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene is now getting into mandatory vaccination in a big way.  It is strong-arming medical centers into forcing their staff to undergo flu vaccination, telling administrators, we hear, that they would be required to fire employees who refuse to undergo flu immunization.   And the mandate would extend beyond direct-care personnel, to include general staff — anyone who might come into contact with a patient.

Since specific vaccine against H1N1 flu is not yet ready, the current plans are said to be for mandatory vaccination against seasonal flu; presumably swine flu vaccine would be added if it becomes available.

No official substantiation yet of the NYC officials’ actions — in fact, we really hope we’re wrong on this.  But we notice that requiring universal vaccination for health care workers would not be out of line with the city’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan — especially chapter 7, “Vaccine Management.”

Clearly, a plan to require immunization of all health care workers — in a city whose health care workforce numbers in the hundreds of thousands — could be a boon to the vaccine makers.

Would it help the public?   If this coming flu season is mild, universal immunization of medical-center staff will be at least partly superfluous.

If there’s a widespread outbreak of virulent flu, the effectiveness of mandatory vaccination in health care centers would depend on the current level of flu-immunization coverage among med-center staff.   As many caregivers routinely undergo seasonal-flu immunization anyway, it isn’t clear that mandatory immunization orders would add any public health value to the current situation.

So far, there hasn’t been much outcry from the public health profession. Perhaps that will change as we get into autumn.

“We all want to believe that a pill or potion that comes from sea coral or from the Amazon jungle will cure that pain for which little else has worked,” Verghese writes.  The “flip side,” he says, “is that we are extraordinarily sensitive to any suggestion that someone is taking away something we think is good for our health.”

And magical thinking’s influence isn’t limited to cruising the natural supplements aisle or reading the ads in a health magazine.  Sometimes it’s part of expert opinion — and so it becomes part of widespread belief.

Consider how the flu experts talk about the possibility of swine flu’s return this fall. In Monday’s Washington Post, the experts’ words wax electric.  Dr. William Schaffner, chair of Preventive Medicine at Vanderbilt U.’s medical school, asserts that “The virus is still around and ready to explode…. We’re potentially looking at a very big mess.” And Dr. Arnold Monto, a physician epidemiologist at U. Michigan’s School of Public Health, worries “about our ability to handle a surge of severe cases.”

So, even as H5N1 reports that an article in The Independent finds scientists skeptical as to whether there will be a so-called second wave of serious flu outbreaks in the northern hemisphere this fall, we’ve got American scientists suggesting — in high-voltage terms — that something awful is going to happen.

They’re not wrong: something bad might happen.  That’s always true.

But language matters.  And language coming from so-called experts matters a lot.  It has magic.

Vigorous metaphors promote popular fears.  The last time swine flu came around, in early 1976, respected virologist Edwin Kilbourne published an influential op-ed piece in the NY Times (13 Feb 1976), called “Flu to the Starboard! Man the Harpoons! Fill with Vaccine! Get the Captain! Hurry!” Kilbourne urged officials to prepare for an “imminent natural disaster.” Fair enough:  a serious H1N1 flu might have happened in ’76 (it didn’t) — but his whaling metaphor appealed to more than just preparation.  It was about power and authority (“get the captain!”).  Presumably, the authority of science, industry, and government.

And so with other metaphors that are meant to be calls to arms.  There were the warfare metaphors about the alleged threat of bioterrorism, and the plague metaphors about AIDS.  Now, there are explosive metaphors about obesity.

Last year, acting U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Steven Galson called childhood obesity a “national catastrophe,” for instance.  And Dr. Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, president of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, warned of obesity’s “corrosive” effects, which, she asserted, imperil a generation of America’s youth.  According to Dr. Matthew Gillman of Harvard “You build [obesity] up over generations” — like an electrical charge in a capacitor, like explosive potential, the reader has to presume.

Talking about childhood obesity, Dr. Eric Hoffman of Stanford told the Washington Post that “we have taught our children how to kill themselves.”

Invoking metaphors to create magical thinking isn’t just an American habit.  Childhood obesity is a “time bomb,” according to physician Howard Stoate, chair of Britain’s All-Parliamentary Group on Primary Care and Public Health.

Verghese’s right.  People can be afraid to let go of what they believe they need for their health — however magically.  And magical thinking is inside the way our experts talk to us about health.  That sort of magic can run deep.

Last Tuesday, a post by Revere at Effect Measure highlighted the effect that cultural anxieties have on the production of scientific knowledge — specifically with regard to modes of contagion.   In the 1920s, a time of worry about immigrants and socialists, public health “concentrate[d] on society’s most marginal people, in keeping with the Zeitgeist.”  Thus Typhoid Mary, and other concerns about germ carriers.  By contrast, when the environment is of most concern, people worry about transmission via objects — fomites in our odd epidemiology jargon (from Latin fomes:  touchwood or tinder).  There are reminders to wash hands after touching the subway handholds, not to handle other kids’ toys, to think about doorknobs.

On Thursday, “Swine flu this fall:  turbulence ahead” took the time to work through the results of mathematical modeling — a highly readable post which explains why some modeling results suggest a rationale for the belief that swine flu might spread intensely in the northern hemisphere this fall.  Revere does the favor of reminding the reader that models are not always good predictors of what will happen.

History shows that the metaphors that guide scientists’ focus in tracking contagion aren’t always perfectly either/or.   They don’t alternate neatly between people-directed or environment-directed, that is — more typically, many myths and metaphors compete for attention, with certain ones winning out at any given moment.  Now, the alleged toxicity of the environment seems very compelling to some people, and there are also contagion concepts based on fears of foreigners, suspicions of supposedy nefarious corporations, worries about open borders, anxieties about public education, concerns that governments keep secrets, and so forth.

The guiding metaphors for contagion breathe life into moral, political, or profit-making campaigns.  The magic-bullet concept remains compelling, for instance, and perhaps accounts for some of the interest not only in Tamiflu but in whether or not flu strains are resistant to it, and whether or not it will be made available,  to whom, and at what cost.  There’s a post at H5N1 on this today.

But there’s an overarching truth about swine flu:  our society can’t seem to leave it alone.  No matter how small the tally of confirmed H1N1 flu deaths (WHO counted 1154 as of the end of July, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control‘s report today puts the number of deaths at 1645 — but even the higher number yields an exceptionally low case-fatality ratio:  under 0.1%, roughly on the order of seasonal flu.  So this remains a far-reaching but so-far mild outbreak.

Yet the question of whether or not it will become more severe — more virulent, more deadly — remains front and center for public health people, and stays alive as a media story.

Okay, yes, it’s important to be prepared.  It would be shameful if there were deaths that would have been preventable with a little forethought and planning.

That accounts for the assiduous tracking by serious public-health people.  But what accounts for the prominence of this rather mild outbreak in the public consciousness?

This is an era of epidemics.  Which is to say, it is an era of fear.  There must be something wrong, it is so easy to think.  This is not just the work of media (although they help, and it doesn’t hurt that playing on fear sells).  It runs deeper than that.  Our modern civilization seems, sometimes, deeply uncomfortable with the world we’ve created.

Last Thursday, for instance, the  New York Times ran a story featuring a study that claimed TV viewing is linked to blood pressure increases in kids.  It’s a story of toxicity in the constructed environment — of the ways contemporary arrangements are inherently and latently harmful (yes, latently:  TV isn’t causing kids to shoot other kids, at least not in this story; it is allegedly causing them to develop a so-called risk factor for later harm).

How do we keep an eye on flu, or other outbreaks, and seek ways to protect everyone from harm as best we can, but avoid hysteria about contaminated toys, subway riding, TV viewing, processed foods, and so forth?  This is a challenge.  It means examining what makes us anxious, and it means understanding that life has risks that can’t be avoided.

This is a good discomfort, no?  Nobody should blithely take advantage of another person, coercing him into donating his organs or making use of her for sexual pleasure without consent.  Watching Stephen Frears’s 2002 film Dirty Pretty Things leaves you appalled and angry at the kidneys-for-passports trade, as it must.  Slavery is an outrage and an offense, a rejection of the values that make ours a civilized society.   Every thinking person decries the trafficking of women for sex.   In modern society, it feels wrong when one person’s body is used to  advantage another’s body.

The exchange of money in the process seems to change the moral valences without exactly alleviating the discomfort.  That children’s families are paid for their manual labor in processing cocoa for the chocolate we eat doesn’t make the practice of child forced labor seem less heinous.  Maybe we even boycott chocolate manufacturers who use chocolate from Ivory Coast, where child labor is involved.  Taking advantage of children’s bodies disturbs us (even to the point of limiting our chocolate purchases).

Money registers differently when it comes to adult sexual exchange.  In the usual American view, there is a bright line between sexual enjoyment obtained through the use or threat of force, and the same enjoyment procured by payment but without force.   Both forcible rape and prostitution are illegal, but most people would recognize a distinct difference between the moral repugnance elicited by rape and the tinge of moral corruption carried by sexual advantage obtained by payment.

Payment introduces a legal twist to sex, too:  the law holds the man who procured sexual advantage through force to be culpable in the act of rape.  Yet, when it comes to paid sex, the legal code holds the woman who provided the sexual service accountable.  The bluenose might scorn both the sex worker and her client equally, but the law makes a distinction.

By contrast, payment makes all the difference when it comes to the use of someone else’s body for productive manual labor.  Your neighbors would be repelled if you were to use force to make a passer-by reshingle the roof of your house, and might have you arrested.  But they aren’t bothered when you hire a roofer.  Most aren’t very bothered when the roofer has some immigrant laborers do the scut work for below-minimum wage — which seems someplace in between a true fee-for-service contract (you in need of a new roof, a roofer able to build one) and slavery.  When money changes hands, it softens the moral impact of making use of someone else’s body.

But the moral flavor doesn’t disappear.  If your roofer refused to let his immigrant workers come down off the roof during a lightning storm, his meager payments to his workers would feel less important than his endangering their welfare.   In other words, onlookers would still be moved by the moral flavor involved in making use of someone else’s body.

Now for the tricky part. What about the use of others’ bodies for medical research? An article in today’s Times laments the shortage of willing bodies for testing cancer treatments.  Contemporary medical ethics presupposes a human trait called “autonomy” and requires that researchers respect this characteristic – for instance by refusing to experiment on a person unless she has signed a consent form acknowledging that she agrees to be experimented on and asserting that she understands the risks and rewards involved.

Of course, the reward system is often obscure, no matter how verbose the researchers are in the process of obtaining consent – in part because it’s often hard to predict who will benefit if new treatments are deemed to be effective, in part because it’s often hard to know how effective a treatment is likely to be, and in part because a big chunk of the benefit accrues to the researchers (articles published, grants funded, awards won) and the research industry (grant funding justified, administrative costs rationalized).

Nobody would accept a system in which people are forced to become medical research subjects.  In fact, the discoveries at Nuremberg about forced participation in medical experiments during the Second World War gave the impetus to the modern field of medical ethics.

But how much does it change the moral outlook if you are rewarded for allowing your body to be used by medical researchers with a cash payment?  The researcher has to be able to claim that her  subjects are not forced to participate – and the medical ethicists who are attached to the autonomy concept will still worry that the subject’s decision to lend his body for research will be coerced, not free and autonomous, if the payment is too grand.

For some classes of people, including children and addicts, payment is deemed to be especially coercive.  The thinking being that if the researcher were to offer $100  to an addict, the addict would use it to buy dope, and that would be harmful, and therefore the researcher would be doing a bad thing even though her research was really meant to do good.   Physician researchers always need to feel that they’re doing a favor to society (not to themselves).

Meanwhile, others decry payments that are too small, arguing that time, angst, and (sometimes) physical or mental suffering involved in being a research subject ought to be reimbursed at respectable rates.   Although the idea of a professional workforce of permanent research subjects, who might receive a retainer in return for surrendering their bodies and tissues for research, rubs physician researchers the wrong way.

Our society really likes medical research. We don’t want our doctors to stop looking for ways to help us to live longer and more comfortably.   Bodies must be used, but they shouldn’t be used without consent, they shouldn’t be purchased outright (that would be slavery), they can’t be paid too much, they shouldn’t be paid nothing, they shouldn’t be recruited for research use in perpetuity or receive the sort of ancillary benefits of employment that professionals get, and they should preferably not be “vulnerable” (young, developmentally disabled, imprisoned, or pregnant).

Which brings us back to kidney donation.  Should kidneys only be allocated anonymously and through a universal system that provides kidneys in accord with a complex algorithm that takes account of the likely benefit of the transplant?  Should there be a federally controlled market in kidneys, or at least some system that encourages donors through market-value incentives (like tax breaks), as Sally Satel has advocated?  Should there be a fully open market through which you could purchase the organ you need from a suitable and willing donor?

The conjunction of bodies-in-service-to-other-bodies and dollars makes the kidney question — like sex work, child labor, and medical research — fraught with moral meanings.  Simple solutions won’t serve.

At DailyKos, doctoraaron explains why he is resigning from the AMA, and is participating in Physicians for a National Health Program.  And DemFromCT notes the high public support for reform, provided it’s affordable.

The AMA is already catching flak for sounding like, well, a bunch of doctors interested only in preserving physicians’ privilege.  Of course, that’s what the AMA is – it’s a trade guild, and (it thinks) it’s doing its job.  The only surprise – especially given how many physicians are firmly behind reform of health care financing — is that the organization is so willing to be so open about being so neanderthal.

The AMA’s statement sounds to us like the organization’s dying gasp.  It’s standing up for a vanishing version of what it means to be a doctor.

In fact, the history of the AMA’s own stance toward social insurance is revealing.  In The Social Transformation of American Medicine, Paul Starr explains that until the 1930s the AMA didn’t like the idea of any medical insurance at all — it was fearful that physicians would fall under the sway of the public health establishment if social insurance were instituted and under the control of insurance companies in the case of private insurance. The AMA has always been more worried about doctors losing control over their own practice than about financing.  Patient care isn’t the AMA’s job, and never has been.

Why social health insurance failed in the U.S. is a complicated story.  It involves ideology, of course, but it’s inflected with plenty of nuance:  the troubled relation of labor unions to American industry, the not-so-troubled relation of industrial corporations to the American political establishment, political favor currying, the rise of scientific medicine, the entire question of whether there should be insurance for medical care.  Through it all runs the AMA’s devotion to the image of the physician as independent decision maker.

The reason for the AMA’s death agony today is that it’s defending a dying species.  Physicians don’t get to make independent decisions much.  And the backward-looking AMA isn’t showing any interest in forward thinking about the positive roles that doctors could play in a really care-centered set-up.

The business of doctoring, which was once a trade that pitted physicians against herbalists, apothecaries, surgeons, patent-medicine hawkers, faith healers, etc., competing for access to Americans’ bodies, has become just a trade, once again. Only now, it’s not that physicians are competing with snake-oil salesmen — it’s that the business of caring for Americans’ health is no longer managed by a medical professional working one-on-one with a patient.

That individual suffering isn’t the main focus of the big, costly healthcare system is well known to anyone who has sought diagnosis of a troubling condition or relief from chronic problems.  That physicians are themselves just cogs in the system isn’t so obvious — until you listen to them talk about their own frustrations.  They wish their practice could be driven by patients’ needs or, at least, by evidence on what treatments work best.  But often the control is exerted by the institution, and by insurance companies’ policies on pricing and payout.

The AMA is still fighting for the vanishing breed, though.  Someday soon, the AMA will have to disband because its constituency, the exalted independent physician, will have become extinct and the organization will have failed to recognize just what the rest of America — including most physicians — wants.  Meanwhile, don’t be surprised to hear its dying gasps.

ADDENDUM:

Just saw Abraham Verghese’s “To the AMA:  It’s Not About You” post at Atlantic magazine today.   He urges the organization, “please don’t tell the American public (a public already disenchanted with physicians and health care) that you are doing this for their benefit because of your great concern for the patient. The public does not believe you. They aren’t that naive.”