Philip Alcabes discusses myths of health, disease and risk.

Bugs in New York

I admit that I haven’t followed the story of the blossoming bedbug population avidly.  Not that I’m cold to the heartache (and itch) that bedbug infestations can bring.  It’s just that an epidemiologist always gets more worked-up about bugs like mosquitoes and ticks that are vectors for microbial pathogens — and bedbugs aren’t.

But this AP article grabbed me.  According to New York City, over 6 percent of residents who responded to a community health survey claimed to have dealt with bedbugs in the past year.  In response, the city will withhold half-million dollars normally budgeted for the city’s health department  and redirect the funds to an anti-bedbug campaign.

Some might argue that the $500,000 would be better used for preventing deadly illnesses and accidents, not just bug bites.  Still, the campaign seems right.  According to the AP story, environmental health people will work with a “top entomologist.” (Professionals collaborating across sectors:  One City, One Health.  Good.)  A note by Javier Hernandez at the NY Times‘s City Room blog is guarded, but some (like Molly Fischer at the NY Observer) seem relieved that there will be a big anti-bedbug crusade at last.

Not a very big crusade, but at least a multifaceted one, as the Bed Bug Advisory Board’s Report suggests.

Questions on World AIDS Day

Today is World AIDS Day.  After thirty years, 25 million deaths, and countless articles, books, press releases, TV and radio programs, fundraisers, AIDS walks, and messages from Bono  –  there’s still an AIDS Day?  It’s hard to see how any disease could be less in need of a boost to awareness.

But how can every day not be AIDS Day?  Over 5,000 people die of AIDS each day, worldwide — even now, in the era of effective therapy.  In south Asia alone, more people die of AIDS every two weeks than have died of the H1N1 swine flu worldwide in the past six months (about 8,000).  In Africa, AIDS takes that toll every two or three days.

AIDS is a big problem in far-away poor countries, in other words.  But unlike the usual poor-nation problems that are easily ignored in comfortable North America — malaria, sleeping sickness, dengue, diarrhea, and more — AIDS is still a problem here, too.   Surely, you might think, we ought not to need any reminders about AIDS.

Much has been said about AIDS, and much has been done.  What does World AIDS Day add?

A harder question, perhaps: why can’t AIDS just be an ordinary disease? Surely, you might think, it isn’t special anymore.

Here are some thoughts on the problem of ordinariness, published in the American Scholar a few years ago.  The occasion was the 25th anniversary of the announcement of the first U.S. cases of AIDS.

No Meeting of Minds on Flu

As the story of the flu pandemic of 2009 matures, it brings out the characteristic traits of each of the  many spheres of interest that it touches.  The physicians are certain that the news is bad, the social critics are skeptical, the official agencies are — in their usual collusion with biotech corporations (especially pharmaceutical companies) — happily promoting high-cost, high-tech responses.  And so on.

Joshua Holland’s post at AlterNet yesterday tries to explain why H1N1 swine flu shouldn’t be cause for hysteria.  He puts this outbreak in the context of flu history and the threat posed by other, more harmful, conditions — malaria for instance.  Holland plays a little bit fast and loose with the numbers:  it probably isn’t accurate to extrapolate, from the number of confirmed flu deaths so far, to get a total number of deaths that will be caused by the swine H1N1 strain this year — more efficient spread in the  cities of the Northern hemisphere in the coming few months is likely to produce fatalities at a higher rate than the more sporadic outbreaks here in April and May.  And he’s overly critical of the media — a point brought out by Revere in a response to Holland at Effect Measure today.

But, as Frank Furedi has been telling us (recently in Erasmus Law Review, for example), try to explain how people’s deep-seated anxieties drive perceptions that risk is extraordinary and unprecedented (and contribute to demands for more and better high-cost technology to deal with it) and you get some people riled up.  Disappointingly, even Effect Measure, whose assessments are consistently level-headed and cogent, slips here, flashing the moral-entrepreneur card at Mr. Holland:

Joshua Holland has never cared for a critically ill person with Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS), which is often the terminal event for flu patients. So I’ll tell him. It doesn’t matter if it’s caused by bacteria (many are). Half of them die no matter what you do and no matter what intensive care unit you have available to you or what antibiotic or what computer controlled respirator. We still can’t do much.

Nobody thinks it’s a good idea to let people get ARDS, and Holland acknowledges that flu is a problem that should be dealt with.  But that’s not always enough.  Question the intensity of perceived risk or the need for all the technology, and you find this out fast.

But Revere is back on track when noting that lots of problems — including malaria — are horrendous and deserve attention, and probably don’t get it because they happen to people far away.

Where would the impetus to deal with global problems besides flu come from?  A global organization that can keep things in perspective would be useful.  Poor W.H.O. isn’t positioned to do that.  Yesterday’s flu advisory from W.H.O. emphasizes the use of antivirals (oseltamivir and zanamivir) to treat people with severe or possibly severe flu:

Early treatment is especially important for patients who are at increased risk of developing complications, those who present with severe illness or those with worsening signs and symptoms.

Yet, the W.H.O. also warns against hastening the development of resistance.  This agency gets a lot of flak for not doing more and for panic-mongering when it does do more.  But, really, it’s only doing its job:  offer advice, and support interventions when invited.  It isn’t consistent, naturally.  It can’t make binding policy.  It faces a limitless and essentially insuperable legitimation problem.  In a way, W.H.O.’s hardest job is simply to maintain its own legitimacy.

Still, in a world poised to interpret signs of illness as evidence of risk and eager for technical fixes to alleviate the sense of vulnerability risk instills, the W.H.O.’s announcements can seem authoritative — and look like beckoning to the drug makers.  A Reuters story yesterday is entitled “Early Use of Antivirals Key in H1N1 Flu: WHO,” and highlights the value of the two antiviral medications more than the caution W.H.O. wants to instill.

Meanwhile, agencies that should be making real policy are focusing on immunization.  In today’s Washington Post, Rob Stein reports on health care workers’ resistance to mandatory flu vaccination.  New York State made flu immunization mandatory early on, not only for salaried health care workers but for anyone — including medical and nursing students — who might come in contact with patients, and is putting teeth into the requirement with sanctions for refuseniks.  The state resorts to high  moral rhetoric to justify its policy.  The state’s health commissioner told Stein that “the rationale begins with the health-care ethic, which is: The patient’s well-being comes ahead of the personal preferences of health-care workers.”

And at CDC, the director is cautioning that there might be a rough start-up to the swine flu immunization campaign, as the first doses of vaccine will be made available in early October.  According to the NY Times, there should be 40 million doses of vaccine available by mid-October.

We wonder whether immunization will be of any public health value at all, by the time there’s enough vaccine that it can be offered to anyone other than health care workers and a few of the people who really need protection (young people, infants’ caregivers, and pregnant women, especially — DemFromCT’s round-up at DailyKos is always worth reading).  Given the rapidity of spread of flu — in 37 U.S. states, H1N1 spread is already regional or widespread; flu is spreading locally in 12 more states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. — and based on the usual course of flu outbreaks, it seems possible that this outbreak will peak by mid November.  There’s no knowing if that will be so, obviously.  Even if it is, immunization would continue to be useful to prevent severe cases among people who are likely to get very sick if infected.

But mass immunization would no longer be of much use in preventing further incidence of infection on a population level if high levels of acquired immunity are reached across much of the population by the time vaccine is widely available.

That’s the problem with relying on mass immunization as the centerpiece of public health response: as in the old joke about comedy, timing is everything.  In 1976, there was too much immunization, too soon.  It might turn out that this year, there’s too little, too late.  The dynamics of vaccine availability and the dynamics of flu spread have to be watched in tandem, and policy updated accordingly.

In any case, with vaccine at the center, the rest of the story — the complex environmental interactions that allow flu genomes to recombine, the trade in animals and feed that allow viruses to move around, the problems of affordability and immune status and competing viral subtypes, the health care facilities to handle severe cases, and so on — gets shoved to the side.

Fear and Flu

Kudos to Revere, for two enlightening posts on flu — which bear on an important issue in the health realm today.

Last Tuesday, a post by Revere at Effect Measure highlighted the effect that cultural anxieties have on the production of scientific knowledge — specifically with regard to modes of contagion.   In the 1920s, a time of worry about immigrants and socialists, public health “concentrate[d] on society’s most marginal people, in keeping with the Zeitgeist.”  Thus Typhoid Mary, and other concerns about germ carriers.  By contrast, when the environment is of most concern, people worry about transmission via objects — fomites in our odd epidemiology jargon (from Latin fomes:  touchwood or tinder).  There are reminders to wash hands after touching the subway handholds, not to handle other kids’ toys, to think about doorknobs.

On Thursday, “Swine flu this fall:  turbulence ahead” took the time to work through the results of mathematical modeling — a highly readable post which explains why some modeling results suggest a rationale for the belief that swine flu might spread intensely in the northern hemisphere this fall.  Revere does the favor of reminding the reader that models are not always good predictors of what will happen.

History shows that the metaphors that guide scientists’ focus in tracking contagion aren’t always perfectly either/or.   They don’t alternate neatly between people-directed or environment-directed, that is — more typically, many myths and metaphors compete for attention, with certain ones winning out at any given moment.  Now, the alleged toxicity of the environment seems very compelling to some people, and there are also contagion concepts based on fears of foreigners, suspicions of supposedy nefarious corporations, worries about open borders, anxieties about public education, concerns that governments keep secrets, and so forth.

The guiding metaphors for contagion breathe life into moral, political, or profit-making campaigns.  The magic-bullet concept remains compelling, for instance, and perhaps accounts for some of the interest not only in Tamiflu but in whether or not flu strains are resistant to it, and whether or not it will be made available,  to whom, and at what cost.  There’s a post at H5N1 on this today.

But there’s an overarching truth about swine flu:  our society can’t seem to leave it alone.  No matter how small the tally of confirmed H1N1 flu deaths (WHO counted 1154 as of the end of July, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control‘s report today puts the number of deaths at 1645 — but even the higher number yields an exceptionally low case-fatality ratio:  under 0.1%, roughly on the order of seasonal flu.  So this remains a far-reaching but so-far mild outbreak.

Yet the question of whether or not it will become more severe — more virulent, more deadly — remains front and center for public health people, and stays alive as a media story.

Okay, yes, it’s important to be prepared.  It would be shameful if there were deaths that would have been preventable with a little forethought and planning.

That accounts for the assiduous tracking by serious public-health people.  But what accounts for the prominence of this rather mild outbreak in the public consciousness?

This is an era of epidemics.  Which is to say, it is an era of fear.  There must be something wrong, it is so easy to think.  This is not just the work of media (although they help, and it doesn’t hurt that playing on fear sells).  It runs deeper than that.  Our modern civilization seems, sometimes, deeply uncomfortable with the world we’ve created.

Last Thursday, for instance, the  New York Times ran a story featuring a study that claimed TV viewing is linked to blood pressure increases in kids.  It’s a story of toxicity in the constructed environment — of the ways contemporary arrangements are inherently and latently harmful (yes, latently:  TV isn’t causing kids to shoot other kids, at least not in this story; it is allegedly causing them to develop a so-called risk factor for later harm).

How do we keep an eye on flu, or other outbreaks, and seek ways to protect everyone from harm as best we can, but avoid hysteria about contaminated toys, subway riding, TV viewing, processed foods, and so forth?  This is a challenge.  It means examining what makes us anxious, and it means understanding that life has risks that can’t be avoided.

Risk, Opportunity, and Care

We’re off this evening to Ukraine and Poland, for a trip involving family heritage and some literary-historical exploration (as well as visiting with friends).

The CDC’s travelers’ health website recommends vaccination against typhoid (as well as hepatitis A and B, and routine childhood immunizations) for travelers visiting small towns and villages in Ukraine.  Since we expect to be doing exactly that, we opted to be immunized.

Picking up the oral typhoid vaccine at a pharmacy in the Bronx made us reflect on inequities in health, and inequalities of opportunity.  How odd, to stand in an air-conditioned pharmacy on a busy street in New York City and prepare to fortify oneself against a disease that, here, we consider of historical interest.  Typhoid makes us think of the sad episode of Mary Mallon, the infamous typhoid carrier, and the struggles of Almroth Wright to develop a vaccine that would limit the terrible toll that typhoid took on British troops in the Boer War.  All a very long time ago.

That typhoid is still a public health problem in much of the world attests to real differences in opportunity.  Clean drinking water, and the sanitary systems that allow water to stay clean, being aspects of opportunity.

The American conversation about health uses the grammar of risk.  Our health professionals talk about the possibility that illness will ensue if people persist in some behavior (smoking, inhaling others’ cigarette smoke, using certain pharmaceuticals, driving while intoxicated, etc.), if authorities fail to inform, if vaccine isn’t produced on time.  But a sense of scale is lost.

Flu preoccupies the risk conversation right now, for obvious reasons having to do with the current outbreak of H1N1 influenza.  The risk conversation sometimes appeals to the terrible pandemic of 1918, the worst single-strike disease outbreak of all time.  But it doesn’t often recall that, in the United States, the 1918 flu spared over 99% of the population.

The talk of risk, the sometimes-lurid conversation about what might happen, almost always occupies itself with the tiny tail of the broad distribution of health – the minuscule proportion of the population that, even in a frightening outbreak, actually dies from it.

What’s left out is the real situation that confronts most people, most of the time.  Not the sudden outbreak, but the persistent struggle to stave off more mundane problems that rarely appear in the media.

Junkfood Science this week reminds us to keep the care in health care.  Care seems relevant here.  The risk conversation gives us clues – sometimes valuable ones – about how to diminish somewhat the number of people who are sickened or killed by a threat, like flu.  But to really get at people’s health – to offer a more thoroughgoing and humanistic form of care – will mean moving past the narrow conversation about risk, and asking about opportunity.

It isn’t risk that keeps most people from achieving capabilities — from escaping poverty, living comfortably, or being free of disability.  It’s more usually bad water, bad food, or just bad government.  A broader and more effective health conversation would start with the conditions of living, and not be preoccupied with the risks of illness alone.